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decisions. Next, we explain the most problematic features of those policies, which include a)
requirements that test-based measures constitute fixed, non-negotiable weight in final decisions, b)
that test-based measures are used to place teachers into categories of effectiveness by applying
numerical cutoffs beyond the precision or accuracy of the available data, and c) that professional
judgment is removed from personnel decisions by legislating (or regulating) specific actions be taken
when teachers fall into certain performance categories. In the subsequent section, we point out that
different types of measures are being developed and implemented across states, and we explain that
while value-added metrics in particular are, in fact designed to estimate a teacher’s effect on student
outcomes, descriptive growth percentile measures are not designed for making such inference and
thus have no place in making determinations regarding teacher effectiveness. We also explain that,
due to the properties of value-added estimates, they have no place in making high-stakes decisions
based on rigid policy frameworks like those described herein. We evaluate the legal implications of
rigid reliance on measures of teaching effectiveness that a) lack reliability and b) may be entirely
invalid.
Keywords: High Stakes; Race to the Top; Value Added Models (VAM)
Las consecuencias jurídicas de imponer decisiones de consecuencias severas basadas en
Información de baja calidad: Evaluación docente en la era de “Carrera hacia la cima”
Resumen: En este artículo, explicamos cómo marcos reglamentarios y legales altamente
prescriptivos y rígidos en materia de políticas sobre evaluación de los docentes, su estabilidad y otras
decisiones en materia de empleo superan la fiabilidad estadística y la validez de las medidas
propuestas de efectividad de la enseñanza. Empezamos con una discusión de la aparición de lo que
consideramos una legislación estatal excesivamente rígida con respecto a la utilización de resultados
de exámenes de estudiantes dentro de sistemas de evaluación docente, específicamente para tomar
decisiones sobre la estabilidad laboral. Luego, se explican las características más problemáticas de
esas políticas, que pueden incluir: a) los requisitos que la prueba de las medidas se constituyen en
cuestiones de peso fijas, no negociables en las decisiones finales, b) que los resultados de exámenes
de estudiantes se usen para asignar a los docentes en categorías de eficacia más allá de la precisión o
exactitud de los datos disponibles, y c) que criterios profesionales sean eliminados de los procesos de
toma de decisiones relacionadas con la estabilidad laboral y reemplazados por legislaciones (o
regulaciones) que imponen medidas concretas tomadas cuando los profesores son clasificados en
determinadas categorías de rendimiento. En la siguiente sección, señalamos que existen diferentes
tipos de medidas que se están desarrollando y aplicando en diferentes estados, y explicamos que, si
bien medidas de valor agregado en particular están diseñados para estimar el efecto de un docente en
los resultados de los estudiantes, las medidas alternativas no están diseñadas para hacer esa inferencia
y, por ende, no tienen lugar para influir en las decisiones sobre la eficacia docente. También
explicamos que, debido a las propiedades de las estimaciones de valor agregado, estas no deberían
ser tomadas en cuenta en decisiones de consecuencias severas basadas en marcos rígidos de política
educativa como los discutidos en este trabajo. Por último, evaluamos las consecuencias jurídicas de
una dependencia rígida en medidas de eficacia de la enseñanza que a) carecen de fiabilidad y b)
pueden ser enteramente inválidas.
Palabras clave: consecuencias severas; “Carrera hacia la cima;” modelos de valor agregado (MVA).
As consequências legais de impor decisões de consequências graves com base em
informações de má qualidade: avaliação de professores na era da "carreira para a cima”
Resumo: Neste artigo, explicamos como marcos legais e políticos altamente prescritivos e rígidos
usados para tomar decisões sobre emprego estabilidade, avaliação dos docentes excedem a
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confiabilidade estatística e validade das medidas propostas sobre a eficácia ensino. Começamos com
uma discussão sobre o surgimento do que consideramos uma legislação estadual muito rígida sobre
o uso de notas dos alunos em provas no sistema de avaliação de professores, especificamente para
tomar decisões sobre a estabilidade do emprego. Em seguida, explicamos as características mais
problemáticas dessas políticas, que podem incluir: a) os requisitos que as medidas dos testes
constituem questões de peso fixo, não negociável nas decisões finais, b) que os resultados dos testes
de alunos sejam utilizados para assignar aos professores em categorias de eficácia além da precisão
ou exatidão dos dados disponíveis e, c) que os padrões profissionais sejam retirados dos processos
de tomada de decisões relacionadas à segurança no emprego e substituídos pela legislação (ou
regulamentos) que imponha medidas específicas quando os professores são classificadas em certas
categorias de desempenho. Na próxima seção, constatamos que existem diferentes tipos de medidas
que estão sendo desenvolvidas e implementadas em diferentes estados, e explicamos que enquanto
as medidas de valor adicionado em particular, são projetados para estimar o efeito de um professor
nos resultados dos alunos, medidas alternativas não são projetados para efetuar essa inferência e,
portanto, não deveriam influenciar decisões sobre a eficácia do professor. Também explicamos que,
devido às propriedades das estimativas de valor adicionado, estes não devem ser levadas em conta
nas decisões de consequências graves para a política educacional como os discutidos neste trabalho.
Por fim, avaliamos as consequências jurídicas de uma dependência rígida em medidas de eficácia do
ensino que: a) não são de confiança e, b) podem ser totalmente inválidas.
Palavras-chave: consequências graves; corrida para a cima; medidas de valor agregado.

Introduction
Spurred by the Race-to-the-Top program championed by the Obama administration and a
changing political climate in favor of holding teachers accountable for the performance of their
students, many states revamped their tenure laws and passed additional legislation designed to tie
student performance to teacher evaluations. States have taken various approaches to these laws.
Arizona, for example, uses a range approach for the weight given to student performance data in its
teacher evaluations; specifically, the state requires that anywhere between 35% to 50% of teachers’
evaluations must be based on student performance data (Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 15203(A)(38) (2012)). Colorado, Florida and Idaho, on the other hand, require that student
performance data, at a minimum, constitute 50% of teacher evaluations (Colorado Revised Statute §
22-9-106(1)(e)(II) (2010); Colorado Revised Statute § 22-9-105.5(2)(c)(1) (2010); Florida Statutes
Annotated § 1012.34(3)(a)(1) (2011); Idaho Code § 33-514(4) (2012); Idaho Code § 33-515(2)
(2012)). Unlike Florida, Idaho and Colorado, however, the District of Columbia Public Schools
(DCPS), Ohio and Louisiana do not stipulate a minimum (District of Columbia Public Schools,
2011, p. 6; Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 3319.112(A)(1) (2011); Louisiana Revised Statute
Annotated § 17:3902(B)(5) (2010)). Ohio Louisiana and DCPS set aside a fixed percentage (i.e. 50%)
of their teacher evaluations for student performance data (District of Columbia Public Schools,
2011, p. 6; Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 3319.112(A)(1) (2011); Louisiana Revised Statute
Annotated § 17:3902(B)(5) (2010)). Delaware’s approach requires that, in teacher evaluations,
student performance data must be “weighted at least as high as any other component” of the
evaluation (14 Delaware Code § 1270(c) (2011)). States such as Maine, Maryland, Indiana, Oregon
and Illinois simply provide that student performance data must be a “significant factor” in teacher
evaluations ((20-A Maine Revised Statute Annotated § 13704(3)(A) (2015) (amended by L.D. 1858);
Maryland Code, Education, § 6-202(c)(4)(i) (2010); Indiana Code § 20-28-11.5-4(4)(c)(2) (2012);
Oregon Revised Statutes Annotated § 342.856 (2013); Oregon Administrative Rules Compilation
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581-022-1723 (2013); 105 Illinois Compiled Statute Annotated 5/24A-5(c) (2011); 105 Illinois
Compiled Statute Annotated 5/34-85c(a) (2011)). Utah merely requires that teacher evaluations must
factor in evidence of student performance (Utah Administrative Rule 277-531-3(B)(3)(b) (2011);
Utah Administrative Rule 277-531-3(C)(1)(b) (2011)). For more on the approaches of various states
under the new teacher evaluation movement, see the state tables in the Appendix.
The desire to consequence teachers who fail to meet evaluation standards based on student
performance data is a growing political movement that has in fact led to a brewing battle in New
York. On June 21, 2012, New York state legislators passed a bill that would limit disclosure of
teacher evaluation ratings to the public (Gormley, 2012). New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
has threatened to circumvent the law by mandating city schools to call parents to disclose the
information (Seifman, 2012). Rather than resort to such tactics as threatened by Mayor Bloomberg,
in most cases, government officials have sought to consequence teachers for failing to meet
evaluation standards by dismissing or terminating teachers. Tenured teachers present the greatest
challenge because of laws that restrict their dismissal to specific grounds. For example,
Pennsylvania’s tenure law provides that once a teacher attains tenure, the teacher cannot be
terminated except on any of the following grounds: incompetency; immorality; unsatisfactory
performance over a specified time frame (two consecutive unsatisfactory evaluations in a span of at
least four months); intemperance; willful neglect of duties; persistent negligence in performance;
cruelty; documented mental/physical disability; felony conviction; persistent and willful failure to
obey school laws; or participation or advocacy of un-American doctrines (24 Pennsylvania Statutes
and Consolidated Statutes § 11-1122 (1996)).
While a number of states such as Pennsylvania have, for several years, had in their tenure
statutes provisions for terminating or dismissing a tenured teacher for two consecutive
unsatisfactory evaluations, which has become the norm in many states. States have argued that the
flexibility to dismiss or terminate teachers whose evaluations do not meet standards based on
student performance is necessary to ensure that only quality teachers are in the classrooms. In some
states, the law mandates termination or dismissal of teachers who fail to meet evaluation standards;
other states leave the decision about termination or dismissal up to the school district. Delaware, for
example, provides discretion to districts to decide whether to terminate a teacher with two
consecutive ineffective ratings (14 Delaware Code § 1273 (2006); 14 Delaware Code § 1411 (2006);
14 Delaware Code § 1420 (2006); 14 Delaware Code § 1270 (2011)). DCPS, on the other hand,
mandates the termination of teachers who are rated minimally effective for two consecutive years
(District of Columbia Public Schools, 2011, p. 62). While Florida gives districts discretion to decide
whether a teacher with consecutive ratings should be terminated, this authority only applies to
employees hired after July 1, 1984 (Florida Statutes Annotated § 1012.33(3) (2011)). Specifically,
Florida allows districts to dismiss teachers with two consecutive unsatisfactory performance ratings
or three consecutive ratings showing the teacher needs improvement (Florida Statutes Annotated §
1012.33(3)). Indiana’s discretion for districts covers teachers with two consecutive ineffective ratings
or teachers rated as needing improvement for three years over any five-year span (Indiana Code §
20-28-7.5-1(e)(4) (2011)). Michigan mandates the dismissal of teachers with three consecutive
ineffective ratings (Michigan Compiled Laws § 380.1249(2)(h) (2011)). Colorado mandates returning
a tenured teacher who has ineffective ratings for two years to probationary status (1 Colorado
Administrative Code 301-87:3.0 (2012)). Louisiana does not even require waiting for two years; the
state law provides that a tenured teacher rated ineffective must immediately be untenured (Louisiana
Revised Statute Annotated § 17:442(C)(1)(2012)). These examples highlight what is at stake for
teachers who fail to meet evaluation standards in their states based on student performance data.
For other examples, see the table in the Appendix.
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Our intent in this article is not to provide a thorough, systematic review of these policies.
Rather, in this article, we seek to address what we consider to be prevalent structural problems with
the current legislative models states have adopted. This article seeks to bring some urgency to the
need to re-examine the current legislative models that put teachers at great risk of unfair evaluation,
removal of tenure, and ultimately wrongful dismissal.

Structural Problems with Current Legislative Models
A relatively consistent legislative framework for teacher evaluation has evolved across states
in the past few years, largely stimulated by explicit and implicit guidelines for states applying to
receive a share of Federal Race to the Top funding (Learning Point Associates, 2010). Many of the
risks of unfair treatment, giving rise to legal concerns, do so because of inflexible, arbitrary
components of this legislative template. Based on cursory review of recently adopted policies, there
appear to be three basic features of the standard model, each of which is problematic in its own
regard, and those problems become multiplied when used in combination.
First, common evaluation models proposed in legislation require that objective measures of
student achievement growth necessarily be considered in a weighting system of simultaneously considered
elements. Student achievement growth measures are assigned, for example, a 40 or 50% weight
alongside observation and other evaluation measures. Our review of state policies indicates more
than 20 states (and the District of Columbia) have adopted a form of this policy component.
Colorado requires that “A minimum of 50% of a teacher’s evaluation must be based on the
“academic growth of the teacher’s students.”1 Less specific, Indiana requires “Objective measures of
student achievement and growth” must “significantly inform” teacher evaluations.2
Placing the measures alongside one another in a weighting scheme assumes all measures in
the scheme to be of equal validity and reliability but of varied importance (utility) – varied weight.
Validity in this case means that the assigned values or statistical estimates in question measure what
they claim to – the effect a teacher has on her students’ achievement growth over the course of the
year. Reliability in this case means that the measures in question are consistent over time and across
tested content. Under common evaluation frameworks, each measure must be included, and must be
assigned the prescribed weight – with no opportunity to question the validity of any measure. That
is, the teacher effect estimate must be included in a teacher’s final rating even if the evaluator has
reason to believe that the estimate is influenced by some factor outside the teacher’s control, or
otherwise misrepresents the teacher’s true effect.
Such a system also assumes that the various measures included in the system are each scaled
such that they can vary to similar degrees. That is, that the observational evaluations will be scaled to
produce similar variation to the student growth measures; and that the variance in both measures is
equally valid – not compromised by random error or bias. In fact, however, it remains highly likely
that some components of the teacher evaluation model will vary far more than others if by no other
reasons than that some measures contain more random noise than others or that some of the
variation is attributable to factors beyond the teachers’ control. Regardless of the assigned weights
and regardless of the cause of the variation (real or noise, that is, random variation) the measure that
(Colorado Revised Statute § 22-9-106(1)(e)(II) (2010); Colorado Revised Statute § 22-9-105.5(2)(c)(1) (2010); 1
Colorado Administrative Code 301-87:3.0 (2012)). Similarly, for Florida, “The law requires that, at minimum, “50
percent of a performance evaluation must be based upon data and indicators of student learning growth assessed
annually by statewide assessments or, for subjects and grade levels not measured by statewide assessments, by school
district assessments” (Florida Statutes Annotated § 1012.34(3)(a)(1) (2011)).
2 (Indiana Code § 20-28-11.5-4(4)(c)(2)(2012)
1
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varies more will carry more weight in the final classification of the teacher as effective or not. In a
system that places differential weights, but assumes equal validity across measures, even if the
student achievement growth component is only a minority share of the weight, it may easily become
the primary tipping point in most high stakes personnel decisions.
Second, the standard evaluation model proposed in legislation requires that teachers be
placed into effectiveness categories by assigning arbitrary numerical cutoffs to the aggregated
weighted evaluation components. That is, a teacher in the 25th percentile or lower when combining
all evaluation components might be assigned a rating of “ineffective,” whereas the teacher at the 26th
percentile might be labeled effective. Furthermore, the teacher’s placement into these groupings
may largely if not entirely hinge on their rating in the student achievement growth component of
their evaluation. Teachers on either side of the arbitrary cutoff are undoubtedly statistically no
different from one another. In many cases as with the recently released teacher effectiveness
estimates on New York City teachers, the error ranges for the teacher percentile ranks have been on
the order of 35th percentile points (on average, up to 50% with one year of data). Assuming that
there is any real difference between the teacher at the 25th percentile and 26th percentile (as their
point estimate) is simply not justifiable in such statistical analysis, even where error ranges are much
narrower. Placing an arbitrary, rigid, cut-off score into such noisy measures makes distinctions that
simply cannot be justified especially when making high stakes employment decisions. Our review of
state policies indicates more than twenty states and the District of Columbia have adopted a
variation of this requirement – application of cut scores for the creation of performance categories.
Indiana uses the following four categories: (i) Highly effective; (ii) Effective; (iii) Improvement
Necessary; and (iv) Ineffective.
Third, it is not uncommon in recent legislation to place exact timelines on the conditions for
removal of tenure. Recent legislation often dictates that teacher tenure either can or must be revoked
after two consecutive years of being rated ineffective (where tenure can only be achieved after three
consecutive years of being rate effective). As such, whether a teacher’s true effect falls just below or
just above the arbitrary cut-offs that define performance categories may have relatively inflexible
consequences. Again, more than twenty states have adopted variations on this policy, either
mandating that local districts take action on specific timelines, or encouraging or permitting such
action on specified time lines. For Colorado, “A nonprobationary teacher who is rated as ineffective
for two consecutive years shall lose nonprobationary status.”3 If the teacher fails to improve, he/she
could be recommended for dismissal by the evaluator.4

Different Measures with Different Purposes
Two broad categories of methods and models have emerged in state policy regarding
development and application of measures of student achievement growth to be used in newly
adopted teacher evaluation systems. The first general category of methods is known as value-added
models (VAMs) and the second as student growth percentiles (SGPs or MGPs, for “median growth
percentile”). Several large urban school districts including New York City and Washington, DC have
adopted value-added models and numerous states have adopted student growth percentiles for use in
accountability systems. Among researchers it is well understood that these are substantively different
measures by design, one being a possible component of the other. But these measures and their
potential uses have been conflated by policymakers wishing to expedite implementation of new
3
4

1 Colorado Administrative Code 301-87:3.0 (2012)
Colorado Revised Statutes Annotated § 22-9-106(4.5)(b) (2010)
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teacher evaluation policies and pilot programs (Ehlert, Koedel, Parsons, & Podgursky, 2012;
Goldhaber & Walch, 2012).
Arguably, one reason for the increasing popularity of the SGP approach across states is the
extent of highly publicized scrutiny and large and growing body of empirical research over problems
with using VAMs for determining teacher effectiveness (Baker, Darling-Hammond, Haertal, Ladd,
Finn, Ravitch, Rothstein, Shavelson, & Shepard, 2010; Corcoran, 2010; Green, Baker, & Oluwole,
2012). Yet, there has been far less research on using student growth percentiles for determining
teacher effectiveness. The reason for this vacuum is not that student growth percentiles are simply
immune to problems of value-added models, but that researchers have until recently chosen not to
evaluate their validity for this purpose – estimating teacher effectiveness – because they are not
designed to infer teacher effectiveness.
Two recent working papers compare SGP and VAM estimates for teacher and school
evaluation and both raise concerns about the face validity and statistical properties of SGPs.
Goldhaber and Walch (2012) conclude “For the purpose of starting conversations about student
achievement, SGPs might be a useful tool, but one might wish to use a different methodology for
rewarding teacher performance or making high-stakes teacher selection decisions” (p. 30). Ehlert
and colleagues (2012) note “Although SGPs are currently employed for this purpose by several
states, we argue that they (a) cannot be used for causal inference (nor were they designed to be used
as such) and (b) are the least successful of the three models [Student Growth Percentiles, One-Step
& Two-Step VAM] in leveling the playing field across schools”(p. 23).
A value-added estimate uses assessment data in the context of a statistical model (regression
analysis), where the objective is to estimate the extent to which a student having a specific teacher or
attending a specific school influences that student’s difference in score from the beginning of the
year to the end of the year – or period of treatment (in school or with teacher). The most thorough
of VAMs, more often used in research than practice, attempt to account for several prior year test
scores on each student (to account for the extent that having a certain teacher alters a child’s
trajectory), the classroom level mix of student peers, individual student background characteristics,
and possibly school level characteristics. The goal is to identify most accurately the share of the
student’s or group of students’ value-added that should be attributed to the teacher as opposed to
other factors outside of the teachers’ control. Notably, important corrections such as using multiple
years of prior student scores dramatically reduces the number of teachers who may be assigned
ratings. For example, when Briggs and Domingue (2011) estimate alternative models to the LA
Times (Los Angeles Unified School District) data using additional prior scores, the number of
teachers rated drops from about 8,000 to only 3,300, because estimates can only be determined for
teachers in grade 5 and above. 5 As such, these important corrections are rarely used in models to be
applied for actual teacher evaluation.
By contrast, a student growth percentile is a descriptive measure of the relative change of a
student’s performance compared to that of all students. That is, the individual scores obtained on
these underlying tests are used to construct an index of student growth, where the median student,
for example, may serve as a baseline for comparison. Some students have achievement growth on
the underlying tests that is greater than the median student, while others have growth from one test
to the next that is less. That is, the approach estimates not how much the underlying scores changed,
but how much the student moved within the mix of other students taking the same assessments,
using a method called quantile regression to estimate the rarity that a child falls in her current
position in the distribution, given her past position in the distribution (Briggs & Betebenner, 2009).
Student growth percentile measures may be used to characterize each individual student’s growth, or
5

See Briggs & Domingue’s (2011) re-analysis of LA Times estimates (pp. 10-12).
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may be aggregated to the classroom level or school level, and/or across children who started at
similar points in the distribution to attempt to characterize the collective growth of groups of
students.
Many, if not most value-added models also involve normative rescaling of student
achievement data, measuring in relative terms how much individual students or groups of students
have moved within the large mix of students. The key difference is that the value-added models
include other factors in an attempt to identify the extent to which having a specific teacher
contributed to that growth, whereas student growth percentiles are simply a descriptive measure of
the growth itself.
As described by the authors of the Colorado Growth Model:
A primary purpose in the development of the Colorado Growth Model (Student
Growth Percentiles/SGPs) was to distinguish the measure from the use: To separate
the description of student progress (the SGP) from the attribution of responsibility
for that progress. (Betebenner, Wenning, & Briggs, 2011)
Unlike value-added teacher effect estimates, student growth percentiles are not intended for
attribution of responsibility for student progress to either the teacher or the school. But if this
limitation is so clearly spelled out, is it plausible that states or local school districts will actually
choose to use the measures to make inferences? Below is a brief explanation from a Question &
Answer section of the New Jersey Department of Education web site regarding implementation of
pilot teacher evaluation programs:
Standardized test scores are not available for every subject or grade. For those that
exist (Math and English Language Arts teachers of grades 4-8), Student Growth
Percentages (SGPs), which require pre- and post-assessments, will be used. The
SGPs should account for 35%-45% of evaluations [emphasis added]. The
NJDOE (New Jersey Department of Education) will work with pilot districts to
determine how student achievement will be measured in non-tested subjects and
grades (NJDOE, 2012).
This explanation clearly indicates that student growth percentile data will be used for
“evaluation” of teacher effectiveness. In fact, the SGPs alone, as they stand, as descriptive measures
“should be used to account for 35% to 45% of evaluations.” Other states including Colorado have
already adopted (pioneered) the use of SGPs as a statewide accountability measure and have
concurrently passed high stakes teacher evaluation legislation. But it remains to be seen how the
SGP data will be used in district specific contexts in guiding high stakes decisions.6
SGPs can be hybridized with VAMs, by conditioning the descriptive student growth
measure on student demographic characteristics. New York State has adopted such a model.
However, the state’s own technical report found “Despite the model conditioning on prior year test
scores, schools and teachers with students who had higher prior year test scores, on average, had
higher MGPs. Teachers of classes with higher percentages of economically disadvantaged students
had lower MGPs” (American Institutes for Research, 2012, p. 1).

In the Spring of 2011, The Colorado State Council for Educator Effectiveness released its report including guidelines
for determining teacher effectiveness. This report hedged on causal interpretation of Student Growth Percentiles,
identifying one standard of teacher effectiveness as follows: “Standard VI: Teachers take responsibility for student
growth” (p. 12).
http://www.cde.state.co.us/EducatorEffectiveness/downloads/Report%20&%20appendices/SCEE_Final_Report.pdf.
As such, there remains some ambiguity as to how the Colorado Growth Model will actually play into district teacher
evaluation frameworks.

6
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Synthesizing the Similarities & Differences
As will be discussed at greater length in the next section, value-added models while intended
to estimate teacher effects on student achievement growth, largely fail to do so in any accurate or
precise way, whereas student growth percentiles make no such attempt.7 Specifically, value-added
measures tend to be highly unstable from year to year, and have very wide error ranges when applied
to individual teachers, making confident distinctions between “good” and “bad” teachers difficult if
not impossible (Baker et al., 2010; McCaffrey, Sass, Lockwood, & Mihaly, 2009; Sass, 2008;
Schochet & Chiang, 2010). Furthermore, while value-added models attempt to isolate that portion
of student achievement growth that is caused by having a specific teacher they often fail to do so
and it is difficult if not impossible to discern a) how much the estimates have failed and b) in which
direction for which teachers. That is, the individual teacher estimates may be biased by factors not
fully addressed in the models and researchers have no clear way of knowing how much. We also
know that when different tests are used for the same content, teachers receive widely varying ratings,
raising additional questions about the validity of the measures (Corcoran, Jennings & Beveridge,
2010; Gates Foundation, 2010).
While we have substantially less information from existing research on student growth
percentiles, it stands to reason that since they are based on the same types of testing data, they will
be similarly susceptible to error and noise. But more troubling, since student growth percentiles
make no attempt (by design) to consider other factors that contribute to student achievement
growth, the measures have significant potential for omitted variables bias. SGPs leave the
interpreter of the data to naively infer (by omission) that all growth among students in the classroom
of a given teacher must be associated with that teacher. Research on VAMs indicates that even
subtle changes to explanatory variables in value-added models change substantively the ratings of
individual teachers (Ballou, Mokher, & Cavaluzzo, 2012; Briggs & Domingue, 2010). Omitting key
variables can lead to bias and including them can reduce that bias. Excluding all potential
explanatory variables, as do SGPs, takes this problem to the extreme by simply ignoring the
possibility of omitted variables bias while omitting a plethora of widely used explanatory variables.
As a result, it may turn out that SGP measures at the teacher level appear more stable from year to
year than value-added estimates, but that stability may be entirely a function of teachers serving
similar populations of students from year to year. The measures may contain stable omitted variables
bias, and thus may be stable in their invalidity. Put bluntly, SGPs may be more consistent by being
more consistently wrong.
In defense of Student Growth Percentiles as accountability measures, Betebenner, Wenning
and Briggs (2011) explain that one school of thought is that value-added estimates are also most
reasonably interpreted as descriptive measures, and should not be used to infer teacher or school
effectiveness: “The development of the Student Growth Percentile methodology was guided by
Rubin et al’s (2004) admonition that VAM quantities are, at best, descriptive measures” (Betebenner,
Wenning, & Briggs, 2011). Rubin, Stuart, and Zanutto (2004) explain:
Value-added assessment is a complex issue, and we appreciate the efforts of Ballou
et al. (2004), McCaffrey et al. (2004) and Tekwe et al. (2004). However, we do not
think that their analyses are estimating causal quantities, except under extreme and
7

Briggs and Betebenner (2009) explain: “However, there is an important philosophical difference between the two
modeling approaches in that Betebenner (2008) has focused upon the use of SGPs as a descriptive tool to
characterize growth at the student-level, while the LM (layered model) is typically the engine behind the teacher or
school effects that get produced for inferential purposes in the EVAAS” (p. 30).
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unrealistic assumptions. We argue that models such as these should not be seen as
estimating causal effects of teachers or schools, but rather as providing descriptive
measures (Rubin et al., 2004, p. 18).
Arguably, these explanations do less to validate the usefulness of Student Growth Percentiles as
accountability measures (inferring attribution and/or responsibility to schools and teachers) and far
more to invalidate the usefulness of both Student Growth Percentiles and Value-Added Models for
these purposes.

At the Intersection of Legal Claims and Statistical Models
In this section, we address the various legal challenges that might be brought by teachers
dismissed under the rigid statutory structures outlined previously in this article. We also address how
arguments on behalf of teachers might be framed differently in a context where value-added
measures are used versus one where student growth percentiles are used. Where value-added
measures are used, we suspect that teachers will have to show that while those measures were
intended to attribute student achievement to their effectiveness, the measures failed to do so in a
number of ways. That is, where value-added measures are used to assign effectiveness ratings, we
suspect that the validity and reliability, as well as understandability of those measures would need to
be deliberated at trial. However, where student growth percentiles are used, we would argue that the
measures on their face are simply not designed for attributing responsibility to the teacher, and thus
making such a leap would necessarily constitute a wrongful judgment. That is, one would not
necessarily even have to vet the SGP measures for reliability or validity via any statistical analysis,
because on their face they are invalid for this purpose.
As Green, Baker, and Oluwole (2012) explain, use of value-added measures in high stakes
teacher dismissal cases raise a number of potential legal bases for the teachers to challenge the
dismissal. This is especially true within the rigid, arbitrary legislative structures identified at the outset
of this article. Specifically, there exists significant possibility that where arbitrary distinctions that
cannot be made, are made, that the policies in question violate the due process rights of teachers
(see also Harris, 2011; Giordano, 2012; Hill, Charalambous, & Kraft, 2012).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law” (United States Constitution
Amendment XIV, § 1). To bring a Due Process challenge, public school teachers must first
demonstrate that the state has deprived them of life liberty or property interest. Teachers might
argue that the use of value-added estimates deprives them of a liberty interest by foreclosing their
employment opportunities. Such claims may be unsuccessful because findings that teachers have
failed to meet professional standards do not prevent them from finding employment elsewhere
(Green, Baker, & Oluwole, 2012). On the other hand, teachers might be able to establish a property
interest in continued employment based on their state’s tenure statute (Green, Baker, & Oluwole,
2012).
Once teachers have established a protectable interest under the Due Process Clause, they
may bring either a procedural or substantive due process challenge. Procedural due process “is a
right to a fair procedure or set of procedures before one can be deprived of property by the state”
(Seal v. Morgan, 2000, p. 574). It is more likely that teachers will challenge the technical shortcomings
of value-added testing policies on substantive due process grounds. In the context of high school
exit examinations, the Fifth Circuit established the following test: “When it encroaches upon
concepts of justice lying at the basis of our civil and political institutions, the state is obligated to
avoid action which is arbitrary and capricious, does not achieve or even frustrates a legitimate state
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interest, or is fundamentally unfair” (Debra P. v. Turlington, 1981, p. 404). A Texas federal district
court has established an alternative substantive due process analysis for high school exit tests:
whether a state’s educational determinations “reflect a substantial departure from accepted academic
norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise
professional judgment” (G.I. Forum Image de Tejas v. Texas Education Agency, 2000, p. 682, quoting
University of Michigan v. Ewing, 1985, p. 225).
VAMs and SGPs may be vulnerable on both procedural and substantive due process
grounds. The technical shortcomings of value-added estimates of teacher effectiveness may be
broken down into questions of a) the reliability of those measures, and/or the precision with which
they may be interpreted, b) the validity of those measures or the extent to which it may be validly
inferred that the teacher had influence over the student outcomes, and c) the understandability of
those measures to the teacher and whether the teacher has the ability to control his or her own fate.
Due Process, Rigid Structures & Noisy Measures (Reliability Concerns)
Reliability of measures of teaching effectiveness is critical for making high stakes decisions.
It is rather unhelpful for example, if a teacher is rated highly on a given metric one year, and
relatively low the next, and then high again the year after that. Such jumps in a performance measure
would give most observers pause to think about whether that measure is really providing any useful
information about the teacher’s true ability. Such is the case in findings from most studies involving
value-added measures (Baker et al., 2010; McCaffrey, Sass, Lockwood, Mihaly, 2009; Sass, 2008;
Schochet & Chiang, 2010). This lack of reliability has been tested in several different ways:
• The correlation of the value-added measures across a group of teachers from one year to the
next.
• The correlation within year across different sections of the same course taught by the same
teacher.
• The standard errors around each teacher’s predicted value.
• The classification error rates, given the standard errors.
In a value-added model, each teacher has a predicted value of the average achievement
growth attributed to them, based on their students. But these predicted values aren’t exact. They are
estimates, given each teacher’s sample of students and given the measures included in the regression
model. Each teacher’s predicted value has a confidence interval – typically reported as the range
within which we can be 95% confident that the teacher’s true value-added lies. There is greater
likelihood that the teacher’s true value-added lies closer to the predicted value than to the extremes
of her confidence interval. In value-added models, these error ranges can be very large, meaning that
one cannot reasonably distinguish between teachers with relatively similar predicted values.
A plethora of published analyses now raise serious concerns about the stability of teacher’s
value-added ratings from year to year. Among the earlier studies reporting this concern, the year-toyear correlations for a teacher’s value-added rating were only about 0.2 or 0.3—at best a very modest
correlation (McCaffrey, Sass, Lockwood, & Mihaly, 2009; Sass, 2008). Sass (2008) also notes that:
About one quarter to one third of the teachers in the bottom and top quintiles stay
in the same quintile from one year to the next while roughly 10 to 15 percent of
teachers move all the way from the bottom quintile to the top and an equal
proportion fall from the top quintile to the lowest quintile in the next year (Sass,
2008, p. 2).
Furthermore, most of the change or difference in the teacher’s value-added rating from one year to
the next is unexplainable—by differences in observed student characteristics, peer characteristics, or
school characteristics (Sass, 2008). More recent studies have not yielded significant improvement in
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year-to-year stability (Gates Foundation, 2010). Preliminary analyses from the MET Project, funded
by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, found that “[w]hen the between-section or between-year
correlation in teacher value-added is below .5, the implication is that more than half of the observed
variation is due to transitory effects rather than stable differences between teachers. That is the case
for all of the measures of value-added we calculated” (Gates Foundation, 2010). Rothstein (2010)
argues that the MET project findings actually overstated the relative stability in the ratings. Pointing
to error ranges of the estimates, Rothstein explains:
For example, even in the model for value-added on the state math test—the easiest
to predict of the measures considered—a teacher whose predicted value-added is at
the 25th percentile (that is, lower than 75% of her colleagues) has only about a onethird chance of actually being that far below average and about the same chance of in
fact being above average. High-stakes decisions made based on predicted value-added
will inevitably penalize a large number of teachers who are above average even when
judged solely by the narrow metric of value-added for state tests. (p. 4)
While some statistical corrections and multi-year analysis might help, it is hard to guarantee or even
be reasonably sure that a teacher would not be dismissed simply as a function of unexplainable low
performance for two or three years in a row.
Table 1 provides a practical example drawn from a typical school within the New York City
database on teacher value-added estimates released to the media earlier this year. The table includes
four teachers from the same school, their predicted values and the upper and lower bounds of their
confidence intervals for 2009-10 ratings. The table also includes the rating assigned to the teacher as
a function of the strict cutoffs applied to the data. Teacher 1 has the lowest predicted value for math
and teacher two for English Language Arts. In those cases, a below average rating is assigned. But it
is clear that the confidence intervals are extremely large for these teachers, raising questions, for
example, as to whether one can reasonably differentiate between the teacher who has an estimated
effectiveness score at the 23rd percentile (Teacher 1, Math) and one at the 39th percentile (Teacher 3,
Math). Confidence intervals may narrow for teachers with multi-year ratings, but only 2 of these 4
teachers had multi-year ratings. To begin with, only four of the forty-eight certified staff had valueadded estimates to begin with, further questioning the value of these data.8 In other words, what
these data provide us are incredibly imprecise and inconsistent measures of supposed teacher
effectiveness for only a tiny handful of teachers in a given school.
Finally, Schochet and Chang (2010), in a report for the U.S. Department of Education’s
Institute of Education Sciences, evaluated teacher value-added estimates in terms of classification
error rates. They found that there is about a 25% chance (if using three years of data) or a 35%
chance (if using one year of data) that a teacher who is “average” would be identified as
“significantly worse than average” and potentially be fired. Of particular concern is the likelihood
that a “good teacher” is falsely identified as a “bad” teacher—in this case a “false positive”
identification. According to the study, this occurs one in ten times given three years of data and two
in ten times given only one year of data.9
Classification errors are especially pertinent where rigid classification schemes are
superimposed on these less-than-precise measures. It is difficult to imagine, for example, that a court
could perceive as substantively fair, a system which may wrongly classify an average teacher as poor
This figure was determined by comparing the number of teachers reported in the teacher effectiveness
database (available at: http://www.ny1.com/content/top_stories/156599/now-available--2007-2010-nycteacher-performance-data#doereports) with the number of teachers reported in the statewide personnel
master file for the same school (New York City school code 01M015.

8

9

Id.
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as much as 35% of the time. In short, the reliability and stability of these measures over time raises
serious questions about their practical value at any level of human resource management and
educational practice. But even more problematic is the integration of such unreliable and imprecise
measures into rigid, high stakes statutory, regulatory and contractual evaluation models.
Table 1
Confidence Intervals for NYC Teacher Ratings in a Selected School
Math
Teacher
Low
Predicted High Rating
Low
Value
Tch1(5th) 3
23
68
Below
12
Avg.
Tch2(4th) 20
65
91
Average 0
Tch3(4th) 5
Tch4(5th) 32

39
71

80
92

Average
Average

4
13

ELA
Predicted High
Value
70
96
11

58

37
68

84
93

Rating
Average
Below
Avg.
Average
Average

Source: Raw data downloaded on February 27, 2012 from http://www.ny1.com/content/top_stories/156599/nowavailable--2007-2010-nyc-teacher-performance-data#doereports

Anderson v. Banks (1981), a high school exit examination case, provides some insight as to
how courts might analyze substantive due process challenges based on errors in measurement. In
Anderson, a Georgia school district required candidates for high school graduation to achieve a
specific score on the mathematics and reading sections of the California Achievement Test (CAT).
Students had four opportunities in the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades to achieve the
required scores. Students who were denied a diploma claimed that the CAT policy was not
rationally related to the goal of improving education within the district because of the district’s
failure to account for the standard error of measurement. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that if
the district had accounted for one standard error of measurement, at least eight out of 42 students
who were denied diplomas in 1978 and 1979 would have graduated. The court rejected this claim
because students could take the CAT multiple times, thus reducing the errors in measurement.
There is at least one important distinction between the high-stakes exit examination
challenged in Anderson and teacher evaluation policies that employ value-added testing. In Anderson,
students had to pass the exit examination in order to earn a diploma. By contrast, in teacher
evaluation policies, student achievement scores are one of several components that states used in
order to rate teachers. Still, courts might still use the approach adopted in Anderson where student
achievement data comprise a major portion of the teacher evaluation policy. Anderson suggests that
states that rely heavily on value-added teacher evaluation policies as grounds for removing tenured
teachers may protect themselves from substantive due process challenges based on measurement
errors by providing these teachers with multiple opportunities to satisfy the testing requirements.
However, states such as Colorado, Florida, Oklahoma, and Tennessee that require student
achievement to account for 50% of their teacher evaluation framework mandate the dismissal of
teachers after two consecutive years of inadequate performance. Louisiana and Washington, DC
appear to permit dismissal after one year of inadequate performance. Thus, the value-added models
in these jurisdictions might be vulnerable to a substantive due process challenge for failing to
sufficiently reduce errors in measurement.
Due Process & Attribution of Responsibility (Validity Concerns)
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The recent release of New York City teacher value-added estimates to several media outlets
stimulated much public discussion about standard errors and statistical noise.10 But lost in that
discussion was any emphasis on whether the predicted value-added measures were, to begin with,
valid estimates of teacher effects. That is, did they actually represent what they were intended to
represent - the teacher’s influence on a true measure of student achievement, or learning growth
while under that teacher’s tutelage. As framed in teacher evaluation legislation, that measure is
typically characterized as “student achievement growth,” and it is assumed that one can measure the
influence of the teacher on “student achievement growth” in a particular content domain.
A brief note on the semantics versus the statistics of evaluation and accountability is in
order. At issue are policies involving teacher “evaluation” and more specifically evaluation of teacher
effectiveness, where in cases of dismissal, the evaluation objective is to identify particularly ineffective
teachers. In order to “evaluate” (assess, appraise, estimate) a teacher’s effectiveness with respect to
student growth, one must be able to “infer” (deduce, conjecture, surmise) that the teacher affected
or could have affected that student growth. That is, for example, given one year’s bad rating, the
teacher had sufficient information to understand how to improve her rating in the following year.
Furthermore, one must choose measures that provide some basis for such inference. Inference and
attribution (ascription, credit, designation) are not separable when evaluating teacher effectiveness. To
make an inference about teacher effectiveness based on student achievement growth, one must
attribute responsibility for that growth to the teacher. In some cases, proponents of student growth
percentiles alter their wording for general public appeal to argue that SGPs are a measure of student
achievement growth, and that obviously student achievement growth is a primary objective of
schooling. To that end, they argue that therefore, teachers and schools should obviously be held
accountable for student achievement growth. Where accountable is a synonym for responsible, to the
extent that SGPs were designed to separate the measurement of student growth from attribution of
responsibility for it, then SGPs are also invalid on their face for holding teachers accountable. For a
teacher to be accountable for that growth it must be attributable to them and one must be using a
method that permits such inference.
We identify 3 categories of significant compromises to inference and attribution and
therefore accountability for student achievement growth:
• The value-added estimate (or SGP) was influenced by something other than the teacher
alone
• The value-added (or SGP) estimate given one assessment of the teacher’s content domain
produces a different rating than the value-added estimate given a different assessment tool
• The value-added estimate (or SGP) is compromised by missing data and/or student
mobility, disrupting the link between teacher and students.
The first major issue compromising attribution of responsibility for or inference regarding teacher
effectiveness based on student growth is that some other factor or set of factors actually caused the
student achievement growth or lack thereof. A particularly bothersome feature of many value-added
models is that they rely on annual testing data. That is, student achievement growth is measured
from April or May in one year to April or May in the next, where the school year runs from
September to mid or late June. As such, for example, the 4th grade teacher is assigned a rating based
on children who attended her class from September to April (testing time), or about 7 months,
where 2.5 months were spent doing any variety of other things, and another 2.5 months were spent
with their prior grade teacher. Let alone the different access to resources each child has during their
Local news stations convened panels to discuss the usefulness of the teacher ratings, including one on February 27,
2012 on New York’s Fox 5 channel, with Sean Corcoran of NYU, Lisa Fleisher of the Wall Street Journal and Heather
Brown of Fox 5 TV.
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after school and weekend hours during the 7 months over which they have contact with their
teacher of record (Lubienski & Crane, 2010).
Students with different access to summer and out-of-school time resources may not be
randomly assigned across teachers within a given school or across schools within a district
(Rothstein, 2009). And students who had prior year teachers who may have done more or less to
advance linearly student achievement in core content areas during the post-testing month of the
prior year may also not be randomly distributed. All of these factors go unobserved and unmeasured
in the calculation of a teacher’s effectiveness, potentially severely compromising the validity of a
teacher’s effectiveness estimate. Summer learning varies widely across students by economic
backgrounds (Alexander, Entwisle, & Olsen, 2001) Furthermore, in the recent Gates MET Studies
(2010), the authors found: “The norm sample results imply that students improve their reading
comprehension scores just as much (or more) between April and October as between October and
April in the following grade. Scores may be rising as kids mature and get more practice outside of
school.” (p. 8)
Numerous authors have conducted analyses revealing the problems of omitted variables bias
and the non-random sorting of students across classrooms (Ballou, Mokher, & Cavaluzzo, 2012,
Briggs & Domingue, 2011; Rothstein, 2009, 2010, 2011). In short, some value-added models are
better than others, in that by including additional explanatory measures, the models seem to correct
for at least some biases. Omitted variables bias is where any given teacher’s predicted value is
influenced partly by factors other than the teacher herself. That is, the estimate is higher or lower
than it should be, because some other factor has influenced the estimate. Unfortunately, one can
never really know if there are still additional factors that might be used to correct for that bias. Many
such factors such as the individual or collective motivation of students in a given class or the
influence of disruptive students are simply unobservable or at least unobserved in the available data.
Other factors may be measurable and observable but are simply unavailable, or poorly measured in
the data. Few if any data systems used for these purposes account for generally disruptive children
and few if any data systems used for these purposes precisely parse differences in family income
status and education, or even disability classification status (differentiating, for example, between
mental retardation and speech impairment under the broad classification of “disability”). While
there are some methods that can substantially reduce the influence of unobservables on teacher
effect estimates, those methods can typically only be applied to a very small subset of teachers within
very large data sets.11 In a recent conference paper, Ballou and colleagues evaluated the role of
omitted variables bias in value-added models and the potential effects on personnel decisions. They
concluded:
In this paper, we consider the impact of omitted variables on teachers’ value-added
estimates, and whether commonly used single-equation or two-stage estimates are
preferable when possibly important covariates are not available for inclusion in the
value-added model. The findings indicate that these modeling choices can
significantly influence outcomes for individual teachers, particularly those in the tails
of the performance distribution who are most likely to be targeted by high-stakes
policies (Ballou, Mokher, & Cavaluzzo, 2012, p1).
One approach is known as the student fixed effects specification which requires that each student who passes through
each teacher for whom an effect is to be estimated has available multiple years of lagged test scores such that the model
can estimate the extent to which any given teacher substantively changes the growth trajectory (within student slope) of
students given their prior trajectory. See Briggs & Domingue (2010). Alternatively, but even more restrictive in terms of
available sample, is the Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2011) bias test which involves evaluating the effectiveness
estimates for teachers who move from one setting to another from year to year and across settings where student
populations vary in terms of initial performance.
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A related problem is the extent to which such biases may not present themselves in obvious
patterns across the entire data set, but where specific circumstances or omitted variables may have
rather severe effects on predicted values for specific teachers. To reiterate, these are not merely
issues of instability or error. These are issues of whether the models are estimating the teacher’s
effect on students’ outcomes, or the effect of something else on students’ outcomes. Teachers
should not be dismissed for factors beyond their control. Furthermore, statutes and regulations
should not require that principals dismiss teachers or revoke their tenure in those cases where the
principal understands intuitively that the teacher’s rating was compromised by some other cause.
Other factors which severely compromise inference and attribution, and thus validity,
include the fact that the measured value-added gains of a teacher’s peers – or team members
working with the same students – may be correlated, either because of unmeasured attributes of the
students or because of spillover effects of working alongside more effective colleagues (one may
never know) (Jackson & Bruegmann, 2009; Koedel, 2009,).
Significant evidence of bias existed in the value-added model estimated for the Los Angeles
Times in 2010 (Felch, Song, & Smith, 2010), including significant patterns of racial disparities in
teacher ratings both by the race of the student served and by the race of the teachers (see Green,
Baker, & Oluwole, 2012). These model biases raise the possibility that Title VII racially disparate
impact claims might also be filed by teachers dismissed on the basis of their value-added estimates,
because the model was more likely to classify teachers of certain races as failing not because of their
actual effectiveness but because of the students they were more likely to have served. Re-analysis of
the LA Times data showed that some of these biases could be reduced by estimating a richer model,
including additional prior student scores and additional demographic measures (Briggs & Domingue,
2010).12
A handful of studies have also found that teacher ratings vary significantly, even for the
same subject area, if different assessments of that subject are used (Corcoran, Jennings, & Beveridge,
2010; Gates Foundation, 2010). If a teacher is broadly responsible for effectively teaching in their
subject area, and not the specific content of any one test, different results from different tests raise
additional validity concerns. Which test better represents the teacher’s responsibilities? If more than
one, in what proportions? If results from different tests completely counterbalance, how is one to
determine the teacher’s true effectiveness in their subject area? Using data on two different
assessments used in Houston Independent School District, Corcoran, Jennings, and Beveridge
(2010) find:
[A]mong those who ranked in the top category (5) on the TAKS reading test, more
than 17 percent ranked among the lowest two categories on the Stanford test.
Similarly, more than 15 percent of the lowest value-added teachers on the TAKS
were in the highest two categories on the Stanford. (as cited in Corcoran 2010, p. 17)
The Gates Foundation MET Project also evaluated consistency of teacher ratings produced on
different assessments of mathematics achievement. In a review of the Gates findings, Rothstein
(2010) explained:
The data suggest that more than 20% of teachers in the bottom quarter of the state
test math distribution (and more than 30% of those in the bottom quarter for ELA)
are in the top half of the alternative assessment distribution (p. 5).
And:

12
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In other words, teacher evaluations based on observed state test outcomes are only
slightly better than coin tosses at identifying teachers whose students perform
unusually well or badly on assessments of conceptual understanding. (p. 5)
Finally, student mobility, missing data, and algorithms for accounting for that missing data can
severely compromise inferences regarding teacher effectiveness. Corcoran (2010) explains that the
extent of missing data can be quite large and can vary by student type:
Because of high rates of student mobility in this [Houston] population (in addition to
test exemption and absenteeism), the percentage of students who have both a
current and prior year test score – a prerequisite for value-added – is even
lower…Among all grade four to six students in HISD, only 66 percent had both of
these scores, a fraction that falls to 62 percent for Black students, 47 percent for ESL
students, and 41 percent for recent immigrants. (Corcoran, 2010, pp. 20- 21)
Thus, many teacher effectiveness ratings would be based on significantly incomplete information,
and further, the extent to which that information is incomplete would be highly dependent on the
types of students served by the teacher.
One statistical resolution to this problem is imputation. In effect, imputation creates pre-test
or post-test scores for those students who were not there. One approach is to use the average score
for students who were there, or more precisely for otherwise similar students who were there. On its
face, imputation is problematic when it comes to attribution of responsibility for student outcomes
to the teacher, as some of those outcomes are statistically generated for students who were not even
there (Raudenbush, 2004; Rubin, Stuart, & Zanutto, 2004). But not using imputation may lead to
estimates of effectiveness that are severely biased, especially when there is substantial missing data.
Howard Wainer (2011) in a video presentation in an event held at Educational Testing Services in
Princeton, NJ explains somewhat mockingly how teachers might game imputation of missing data
by sending all of their best students on a field trip during fall testing days, and then, in the name of
fairness, sending the weakest students on a field trip during spring testing days.13
Clearly, in such a case of gaming, the predicted value-added assigned to the teacher as a
function of the average scores of low performing students at the beginning of the year (while their
high performing classmates were on their trip), and high performing ones at the end of the year
(while their low performing classmates were on their trip), would not be correctly attributed to the
teacher. The teacher might be responsible for her value-added estimate – in a perverse sense, but
that does not by any stretch mean that the teacher is “effective.”
To summarize, there are a multitude of potential threats to the validity of teacher
effectiveness estimates, including non-random assignment, omitted variables bias, missing data
problems, and variation in estimates arising from different tests of the same subject area. Each of
these threats to validity raises due process concerns for teachers. The strong likelihood that teacher
effect estimates are influenced by factors outside the teacher’s control raises due process concerns
where those estimates affect the teacher’s property interests. While the courts have not addressed
this question with respect to teachers and their students’ achievement, courts have addressed this
question with respect to the control individual students have over their own fate under high stakes
testing regimes.
Two high school exit examination cases, Debra P. v. Turlington (1981, 1984) and G.I. Forum
Imaje de Tejas v. Texas Education Agency (2000) provide some guidance as to how a court might analyze
a substantive due process challenge by teachers based on the failure of a value-added model to
account for matters that are outside the control of teachers. In Debra P., minority students alleged
that Florida’s high school exit test requirement violated the Due Process Clause. A federal district
13
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court agreed because the state failed to give students’ sufficient notice before infringing upon their
property right to obtain a diploma.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that Florida’s high-stakes test had to satisfy accepted
standards of instructional validity: that is, whether the test measured what was actually taught in the
state’s schools. The court declared that the test would violate substantive due process if the test
failed to cover material that was not covered in the students’ classrooms. The court then remanded
the case to determine whether the state had satisfied notions of curricular validity (Debra P. v.
Turlington, 1981). On remand, the district court held that the test accomplished this goal. The court
cited the state’s efforts to provide remediation to students who could not master the material and a
student survey, which found that 90-95% of students believed that they had been taught the test
skills. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that the state needed to focus on students who had
failed to pass the high-stakes test in order to establish curricular validity. This was the case because
the experts “conceded that there are no accepted educational standards for determining whether a
test is [curricularly] valid” (Debra P. v. Turlington, 1984, p. 1412).
In the G.I. Forum case, minority students alleged that the state of Texas’ high-stakes
graduation test violated substantive due process. A federal district court rejected the students’
challenge. First, the court held that the test satisfied accepted standards of curricular validity
because “it measures what it purports to measure and it does so reliably” (G.I. Forum Imaje de Tejas v.
Texas Education Agency, 2000, p. 682). The court held that the Texas high school exit test was not a
substantial departure from accepted academic norms or a failure to use professional judgment. In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted: “There was no testimony demonstrating that Texas has
rejected current academic standards in designing its education system. Educators and test-designers
testified that the design and the use of the test were within accepted norms” (pp. 682-83).
It is important to observe that in the Debra P. case, the Fifth Circuit observed that there were
no accepted standards for determining whether the high school exit test satisfied curricular validity.
Thus, it was easy for the state to establish the validity of the test (Green, Baker, & Oluwole, 2012).
Also, in the G.I. Forum case, the court found no evidence that Texas’ high school exit test fell outside
academic norms. By contrast, it is impossible for value-added testing to sufficiently reduce the bias
caused by factors outside of teachers’ control to make such tests a valid measure of determining
teacher effectiveness (see Green, Baker, & Oluwole, 2012 for a summary of multiple sources on this
point). As the Economic Policy Institute explains: “[T]here is broad agreement among statisticians,
psychometricians, and economists that student test scores alone are not sufficiently reliable and valid
indicators of teacher effectiveness to be used in high-stakes personnel decisions, even when the
most sophisticated statistical applications such as value-added modeling are employed” (Baker et al.,
2010, p. 2).

Conclusions and Implications
As we have explained herein, value-added measures have severe limitations when attempting
even to answer the narrow question of the extent to which a given teacher influences tested student
outcomes. As such, we argue that it would be foolish to impose on these measures, rigid, overly
precise high stakes decision frameworks. One simply cannot parse point estimates to place teachers
into one category versus another and one cannot necessarily assume that any one individual teacher’s
estimate is necessarily valid (non-biased). Furthermore, we have explained how student growth
percentile measures being adopted by states for use in teacher evaluation are, on their face, invalid
for this particular purpose. Overly prescriptive, rigid teacher evaluation mandates, in our view, are
likely to open the floodgates to new litigation over teacher due process rights. This is likely despite
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the fact that much of the policy impetus behind these new evaluation systems is the reduction of
legal hassles involved in terminating ineffective teachers.
Due process is violated where administrators or other decision-makers place blind faith in
the quantitative measures, assuming them to be causal and valid (attributable to the teacher) and
applying arbitrary and capricious cutoff-points to those measures (performance categories leading to
dismissal). The problem, as we see it, is that some of these new state statutes require these due
process violations, even where the informed, thoughtful professional understands full well that she
is being forced to make a wrong decision. They require that decision makers take action based on
these measures even against their own informed professional judgment.
This is not to suggest that any and all forms of student assessment data should be considered
moot in thoughtful decision-making by school leaders and leadership teams. Rather, that incorrect,
inappropriate use of this information is simply wrong – ethically and legally (a lower standard)
wrong. We accept the proposition that tests of student knowledge and skills can provide useful
insights both regarding what students know and potentially regarding what they have learned while
attending a particular school or class. We are increasingly skeptical regarding the ability of valueadded statistical models to parse any specific teacher’s effect on those outcomes. Furthermore, the
relative weight in management decision-making placed on any one measure depends on the quality
of that measure and likely fluctuates over time and across settings. That is, in some cases, with some
teachers and in some years, test data may provide leaders and/or peers with more useful insights. In
other cases, it may be quite obvious to informed professionals that the signal provided by the data is
simply wrong – not a valid representation of the teacher’s effectiveness.
Arguably, a more reasonable and efficient use of these quantifiable metrics in human
resource management might be to use them as a knowingly noisy pre-screening tool to identify
where problems might exist across hundreds of classrooms in a large district. Value-added estimates
might serve as a first step toward planning which classrooms to observe more frequently. Under
such a model, when observations are completed, one might decide that the initial signal provided by
the value-added estimate was simply wrong. One might also find that it produced useful insights
regarding a teacher’s (or group of teachers’) effectiveness at helping students develop certain tested
skills.
School leaders or leadership teams should clearly have the authority to make the case that a
teacher is ineffective and that the teacher even if tenured should be dismissed on that basis. It may
also be the case that the evidence would actually include data on student outcomes – growth, etc.
The key, in our view, is that the leaders making the decision – indicated by their presentation of the
evidence – would show that they have reasonably used information to make an informed
management decision. Their reasonable interpretation of relevant information would constitute due
process, as would their attempts to guide the teacher’s improvement on measures over which the
teacher actually had control.
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Appendix
State Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
The tables below set forth the approaches of various states to the new teacher evaluation
movement. Specifically, we set forth the quantitative weight states assign student achievement in
their teacher evaluations. We also specify the classifications states use to rate teacher performance
under their evaluations. The table also identifies the timelines (if any) provided in state law or policy
for dismissing tenured teachers rated ineffective under the state’s evaluation system.
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Table A1.
Arizona’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

The model framework for teacher evaluations
created by the state board of education must
include “quantitative data on student academic
progress that accounts for between thirty-three
per cent and fifty per cent of the evaluation
outcomes” (Arizona Revised Statutes
Annotated § 15-203(A)(38) (2012)) (as
amended by House Bill 2823. (2012). Retrieved
June 1, 2012, from Arizona Legislature Web
Site:
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/2r/laws/
0259.pdf)

None[1]

(i) Highly effective;

(ii) Effective;

Arizona

Teachers in the lowest performance
classification are offered an intervention
only once (Arizona Revised Statute § 15537(C)(1)-(3) (2012)): Before being
dismissed for inadequate performance, the
teacher must be given a minimum of sixty
instructional days to rectify the inadequate
performance; if the teacher fails to show
adequate performance within this time
frame, the district is required to dismiss
the teacher (Arizona Revised Statute § 15539 (2012)). The notice of inadequate
performance must be initiated not later
than the teacher’s second consecutive
year in the lowest performance (Arizona
Revised Statute § 15-537(C)(4) (2012)).

(iii) Developing;
and

(iv) Ineffective
(Arizona Revised
Statutes Annotated
§ 15-203(A)(38)
(2012)).
[1] In the table, “none” refers to cases where there is either no tenure in the state or where the tenure provision includes
no specified timeline for how soon after an ineffective rating a teacher should be dismissed. Note, however, that in
Arizona, tenured teachers can be dismissed for inadequate performance (Arizona Revised Statute § 15-539(C) (2012)).
The definition of inadequate performance is based on the state’s performance classifications for teachers. (Arizona
Revised Statute § 15-539(D) (2012)). In Alaska, which currently does not require quantified student achievement as a
significant component of evaluations, a tenured teacher who fails to meet district performance standards is provided a
plan of improvement. Unless the teacher and the evaluating administrator agree to an extension, the improvement plan
must be in effect for at least 90 workdays and at most 180 workdays. During this time, the teacher must be observed at
least twice. If the teacher still fails to meet the district performance standards by the end of the term of the improvement
plan, the district has the discretion to nonretain the teacher. (Alaska Statute § 14.20.149(e) (2009); Alaska Statute §
14.20.175(b)(1) (2008)). Georgia uses an annual contract for its teachers (Georgia Code Annotated § 20-2-211 (2011);
Georgia Code Annotated § 20-2-940 (2013)). In New Hampshire, the law provides that “the grounds for
nonrenomination and nonreelection shall be determined at the sole discretion of the school board” (New Hampshire
Revised Statute § 189:14-a (2011)).
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Table A2.
Arkansas’ Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

No

No[1]

(i) Distinguished;
(ii) Proficient;

Arkansas

(iii) Basic; and
(iv) Unsatisfactory
(Arkansas Code
Annotated § 6-172805 (2011)).
[1] The Teacher Fair Dismissal Act of 1983 specifically states that Arkansas law does not provide teachers tenure
because the law “does not confer lifetime appointment of teachers” (Arkansas Code Annotated 6-17-1503(b) (2005)).

Table A3.
Connecticut’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Connecticut

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

None

A district is authorized to terminate a
tenured teacher at “any time” for
incompetency or inefficiency because of
the teacher’s evaluation based on student
academic growth (Connecticut General
Statute § 10-151(d)(1)(2011); Connecticut
General Statute § 10-151b (2011)).

N/A[1]

[1] N/A = Not Applicable.
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Table A4.
Colorado’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Colorado

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

A minimum of 50% of a teacher’s evaluation
must be based on the “academic growth of the
teacher’s students” (Colorado Revised Statute §
22-9-106(1)(e)(II) (2010); Colorado Revised
Statute § 22-9-105.5(2)(c)(1) (2010); 1
Colorado Administrative Code 301-87:3.0
(2012)).

“A nonprobationary teacher who is
rated as ineffective for two consecutive
years shall lose nonprobationary
status.” (1 Colorado Administrative
Code 301-87:3.0 (2012)). If the teacher
fails to improve, he/she could be
recommended for dismissal by the
evaluator (Colorado Revised Statutes
Annotated § 22-9-106(4.5)(b) (2010)).

(i) Ineffective;

(ii) Partially
effective;
(iii) Effective; and
(iv) Highly
effective (1
Colorado
Administrative
Code 30187:3.0(3.03)
(2012)).
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Table A5.
Delaware’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly
Based On Quantified Student
Achievement?

The state’s evaluation system
known as the Delaware
Performance Appraisal System
II (DPAS II) “must have no
more than 5 components and
must have a strong focus on
student improvement, with 1
component dedicated
exclusively to student
improvement and weigh

Delaware

Timelines For Dismissing A
Tenured Teacher Rated Ineffective
Whenever a teacher is deemed to
have a pattern of ineffective
teaching based on the state’s
evaluation system, the district has
the discretion of terminating the
teacher based on incompetency (14
Delaware Code § 1273 (2006); 14
Delaware Code § 1411 (2006); 14
Delaware Code § 1420 (2006); 14
Delaware Code § 1270 (2011)). “If a
teacher’s overall Summative
Evaluation rating is determined to
be ‘Needs Improvement’ for the
third consecutive year, the teacher’s
rating shall be re-categorized as
‘Ineffective’” (14 Delaware
Administrative Code 106A(6.2.5)
(2011) Teacher Appraisal Process
Delaware Performance Appraisal
System (DPAS II) Revised. (2011,
December 1). Retrieved June 1,
2012, from Delaware Administrative
Code Web Site:
http://regulations.delaware.gov/Ad
minCode/title14/100/106A.pdf).
The law considers two consecutive
ratings of ‘Ineffective’ as a pattern
of ineffective teaching (14 Delaware
Administrative Code 106A(7.1)
(2011) Teacher Appraisal Process
Delaware Performance Appraisal
System (DPAS II) Revised. (2011,
December 1). Retrieved June 1,
2012, from Delaware Administrative
Code Web Site:
http://regulations.delaware.gov/Ad
minCode/title14/100/106A.pdf)

Teacher Performance Categories

The rating categories for each
component of a teacher’s evaluation
are:

(i) Satisfactory;
(ii) Unsatisfactory (14 Delaware
Code § 1270(b) (2011)).
For the overall rating of the
teacher’s performance, the
categories are:
(i) Highly Effective;
(ii) Effective;

(iii) Needs Improvement;
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Table A5. (Cont.’d)
Delaware’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Delaware

Teacher Evaluation Significantly
Based On Quantified Student
Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A
Tenured Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance Categories
(iv) Ineffective (14 Delaware
Administrative Code 106A(6.0)
(2011) Teacher Appraisal Process
Delaware Performance Appraisal
System (DPAS II) Revised. (2011,
December 1). Retrieved June 1,
2012, from Delaware
Administrative Code Web Site:
http://regulations.delaware.gov/Ad
minCode/title14/100/106A.pdf). A
satisfactory evaluation is equivalent
to the “overall ‘Highly Effective’,
‘Effective’ or ‘Needs Improvement’
rating on the summative evaluation
and shall be used to qualify for a
continuing license” (14 Delaware
Administrative Code 106A(2.0)
(2011) Teacher Appraisal Process
Delaware Performance Appraisal
System (DPAS II) Revised. (2011,
December 1). Retrieved June 1,
2012, from Delaware
Administrative Code Web Site:
http://regulations.delaware.gov/Ad
minCode/title14/100/106A.pdf;
DPAS II Guide for Teachers .
(2011, September 1). Retrieved June
1, 2012, from Delaware
Performance Appraisal System Web
Site:
http://www.doe.k12.de.us/csa/dpa
sii/ti/DPASIITeacherFullGuide-97-11.pdf).
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Table A6.
District of Columbia’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

District
of
Columbia
Public
Schools
(DCPS)

Teacher Evaluation
Significantly Based On
Quantified Student
Achievement?
Under IMPACT – the DCPS
evaluation system – student
achievement data accounts for 50%
of teacher evaluations (Group 1
General Education Teachers with
Individual Value-Added Student
Achievement Data 6. (2011,
August). Retrieved June 1, 2012,
from The District of Columbia
Public Schools Effectiveness
Assessment System for SchoolBased Personnel Web Site:
http://dcps.dc.gov/DCPS/Files/d
ownloads/TEACHING%20&%20
LEARNING/IMPACT/IMPACT
%20Guidebooks%2020102011/Impact%202011%20Group
%201-Aug11.pdf).

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective
Teachers who are rated “‘Minimally
Effective’ for two consecutive years
will be subject to separation from the
school system” (Group 1 General
Education Teachers with Individual
Value-Added Student Achievement
Data 62. (2011, August). Retrieved
June 1, 2012, from The District of
Columbia Public Schools
Effectiveness Assessment System for
School-Based Personnel Web Site:
http://dcps.dc.gov/DCPS/Files/dow
nloads/TEACHING%20&%20LEAR
NING/IMPACT/IMPACT%20Guid
ebooks%2020102011/Impact%202011%20Group%20
1-Aug11.pdf).

Teacher Performance
Categories

(i) Highly Effective;

(ii) Effective;
(iii) Minimally Effective;
or
For teachers who are rated
‘Ineffective’, this is an unacceptable
performance. Consequently, the twoconsecutive-years rule applicable to
teachers rated ‘Minimally Effective’
does not apply; rather teachers rated
Ineffective “will be subject to
separation from the school system”
(Group 1 General Education Teachers
with Individual Value-Added Student
Achievement Data 62. (2011, August).
Retrieved June 1, 2012, from The
District of Columbia Public Schools
Effectiveness Assessment System for
School-Based Personnel Web Site:
http://dcps.dc.gov/DCPS/Files/dow
nloads/TEACHING%20&%20LEAR
NING/IMPACT/IMPACT%20Guid
ebooks%2020102011/Impact%202011%20Group%20
1-Aug11.pdf).

(iv) Ineffective (What Are
the Final IMPACT
Ratings? (2011). Retrieved
June 1, 2012, from
District of Columbia
Public Schools, An
Overview of IMPACT
Web Site:
http://dcps.dc.gov/DCP
S/In+the+Classroom/E
nsuring+Teacher+Succes
s/IMPACT+%28Perfor
mance+Assessment%29/
An+Overview+of+IMP
ACT).
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Table A7.
Florida’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly
Based On Quantified Student
Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance Categories

The law requires that, at minimum,
“50 percent of a performance
evaluation must be based upon
data and indicators of student
learning growth assessed annually
by statewide assessments or, for
subjects and grade levels not
measured by statewide
assessments, by school district
assessments”[1] (Florida Statutes
Annotated § 1012.34(3)(a)(1)
(2011)).[2]

Teachers who got continuing contract
status before July 1, 1984 will keep
that status unless the teacher: (i)
willingly gives up the continuing
contract status; or (ii) is dismissed on
grounds such as incompetency; or (iii)
is returned to annual contracts for
three years at the discretion of the
district for “good and sufficient
reasons” (Florida Statutes Annotated §
1012.33(4)(2011)).[3]

(i) Highly Effective;

(ii) Effective;
Florida

Teachers employed after July 1, 1984
have a professional service contract
which must be renewed annually
unless the district chooses to dismiss
the teacher who: (i) is charged with
unsatisfactory performance; or (ii) has
“two consecutive annual performance
evaluation ratings of unsatisfactory”;
or (iii) has “two annual performance
evaluation ratings of unsatisfactory
within a 3-year period”; or (iv) has
“three consecutive annual evaluation
ratings of needs improvement or a
combination of needs improvement
and unsatisfactory” (Florida Statutes
Annotated § 1012.33(3)(2011)).

(iii) Needs Improvement;[4] and

(iv) Unsatisfactory (Florida
Statutes Annotated §
1012.34(2)(e) (2011)).
[1] School districts granted an exemption pursuant to Florida’s Race to the Top Memorandum of Understanding for
Phase 2 can use 40% instead of 50% (Florida Statutes Annotated § 1012.341 (2011)).
[2] Additionally, “the student learning growth portion of the evaluation must include growth data for students assigned
to the teacher over the course of at least 3 years.
If less than 3 years of data are available, the years for which data are available must be used and the percentage of the
evaluation based upon student learning growth may be reduced to not less than 40 percent” Florida Statutes Annotated
§ 1012.34(3)(a)(1)(a) (2011).
[3] Beginning in July 1, 2011, all new teachers hired in Florida are on annual contracts (Florida Statutes Annotated §
1012.335(2)(2011)). These teachers can be dismissed on various grounds including incompetency (Florida Statutes
Annotated § 1012.335(5)(c)(2011)).
[4] For those “instructional personnel in the first 3 years of employment who need improvement” the term used is
“developing” instead of “needs improvement” (Florida Statutes Annotated § 1012.34(2)(e)(3) (2011)).
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Table A8.
Idaho’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

Teachers hired after January 31, 2011
operate under two different contract
categories: contract A or contract B
(Idaho Code § 33-514 (2012)).[1]

None

The suggested categories for
districts to use are:
(i) Unsatisfactory;

Unless in a case of reduction in force, if
the district decides not to reemploy a
category A contract teacher or a category
B contract teacher, the decision must be
made after an evaluation of the teacher.
(Idaho Code § 33-514(2) (2012)).

Idaho

“The objective measure(s) of growth in
student achievement shall comprise at
least fifty percent (50%) of the total
written evaluation” (Idaho Code § 33514(4) (2012)). This same 50% rule
applies to teachers who had acquired
tenure status prior to January 31, 2012
(Idaho Code § 33-515(2) (2012)).[2]

(ii) Basic;

However, before a school district
chooses to non-renew teachers with
grandfathered renewable contracts,
Idaho law entitles such teachers to “a
defined period of probation as
established by the board, following
an observation, evaluation or partial
evaluation” (Idaho Code § 33-515(5)
(2012)). The length of the probation
is not specified.

(iii) Proficient;

(iv) Distinguished (Idaho State
Department of Education,
(2009). Implementation
Guidelines. Retrieved May 25,
2012, from
http://www.sde.idaho.gov/sit
e/teacherEval/implementatio
nGuidelines.htm).
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Table A8. (Cont.’d)
Idaho’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories
The evaluation performance
categories used by a district
must “at a minimum, address
proficient and unsatisfactory
practice” (Idaho State
Department of Education,
(2009). Implementation
Guidelines. retrieved May 25,
2012, from
http://www.sde.idaho.gov/sit
e/teacherEval/implementatio
nGuidelines.htm).

Idaho

[1] The category A contract is defined as “a limited one (1) year contract for certificated personnel in the first or greater
years of continuous employment with the same school district” (Idaho Code § 33-514(2)(a) (2012)).
The category B contract is defined as “a limited two (2) year contract that may be offered at the sole discretion of the
board of trustees for certificated personnel in their fourth or greater year of continuous employment with the same
school district” (Idaho Code § 33-514(2)(b) (2012)). Additionally, “[t]he board of trustees may, at its sole discretion, add
an additional year to such a contract upon the expiration of the first year, resulting in a new two (2) year contract”
(Idaho Code § 33-514(2)(b) (2012)).
[2] Idaho law no longer provides for “vesting of tenure, continued expectations of employment or property rights in an
employment relationship” (Idaho Code § 33-515(1) (2012)). Instead, teachers who had tenure rights prior to January 31,
2011 shall operate under grandfathered renewable contracts with “the right to the continued automatic renewal of that
employee's employment contract by giving notice, in writing, of acceptance of renewal” (Idaho Code § 33-515(2)
(2012)). These automatic renewals could be “for a shorter term, longer term or the same length of term as the length of
term stated in the current contract, and at a greater, lesser or equal salary to that stated in the current contract” (Idaho
Code § 33-515(2)-(3) (2012)).
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Table A9.
Illinois’ Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly
Based On Quantified Student
Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A
Tenured Teacher Rated
Ineffective

Teacher Performance Categories

Student performance data must
be a “significant” factor in
teacher evaluations (105 Illinois
Compiled Statute Annotated
5/24A-5(c) (2011); (105 Illinois
Compiled Statute Annotated
5/34-85c(a) (2011)).

If a teacher is found to have
unsatisfactory performance
consequent to an evaluation of
the teacher, the district could
choose to dismiss the teacher for
failure to “complete a
remediation plan with a rating
equal to or better than a
‘Proficient’ rating” (105 Illinois
Compiled Statute Annotated
5/24-16.5(b) (2011)).[1]

(i) Excellent;

(ii) Proficient;
(iii) Needs Improvement; or
Additionally, “if a teacher in
contractual continued service
successfully completes a
remediation plan following a
rating of ‘unsatisfactory’ and
receives a subsequent rating of
‘unsatisfactory’ in any of the
teacher’s annual or biannual
overall performance evaluation
(iv) Unsatisfactory (105 Illinois
ratings received during the 36Compiled Statute Annotated 5/24Amonth period following the
5(e) (2012); (105 Illinois Compiled
teacher’s completion of the
Statute Annotated 5/34-85c(a) (2011)).
remediation plan, then the school
district may forego remediation
and seek dismissal” of the
teacher (Illinois Compiled Statute
Annotated 105 ILCS 5/24A-5(n)
(2011); Illinois Compiled Statute
Annotated 105 ILCS 5/24-12
(2011)).
[1] The law also provides that a “school district may not, through agreement with a teacher or its teacher representatives,
waive its right to dismiss a teacher under this Section” (105 Illinois Compiled Statute Annotated 5/24-16.5(b) (2011)).
Illinois
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Table A10.
Indiana’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Indiana

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A
Tenured Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

“Objective measures of student
achievement and growth” must
“significantly inform” teacher evaluations
(Indiana Code § 20-28-11.5-4(4)(c)(2)
(2012);Indiana Department of Education,
(2012). Evaluation Law and Guidance.
Retrieved May 24, 2012, from
http://www.doe.in.gov/improvement/edu
cator-effectiveness/evaluation-law-andguidance).

Districts can choose to terminate
teacher contracts at any time for
incompetence which includes (i) “an
ineffective designation on two (2)
consecutive performance
evaluations”; or (ii) “an ineffective
designation or improvement
necessary rating in three (3) years
of any five (5) year period”
(Indiana Code § 20-28-7.5-1(e)(4)
(2011)).

(i) Highly effective;

(ii) Effective;
(iii) Improvement
Necessary; and
(iv) Ineffective (Indiana
Code § 20-28-11.54(4)(c)(4) (2012)).
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Table A11.
Louisiana’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Louisiana

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

The evaluation plans used by districts must
meet the following: “fifty percent of such
evaluations shall be based on evidence of
growth in student achievement using a
value-added assessment model as
determined by the board for grade levels
and subjects for which value-added data is
available. For grade levels and subjects for
which value-added data is not available and
for personnel for whom value-added data
is not available, the board shall establish
measures of student growth” (Louisiana
Revised Statute Annotated § 17:3902(B)(5)
(2010)).

If a tenured teacher is rated
“ineffective” under the state’s
performance evaluation, the teacher
“shall immediately lose his tenure
and all rights related thereto”
(Louisiana Revised Statute Annotated
§ 17:442(C)(1)(2012) (amended by
House Bill 974 (2012). Retrieved June
1, 2012, from Lousiana State
Legislature Web Site:
http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/
streamdocument.asp?did=793654)).

(i) Effective; and

The law also provides that tenured
teachers can be terminated for
incompetence and willful neglect of
duty. A teacher’s rating as
“ineffective” under the state’s
performance evaluation “shall
constitute sufficient proof of poor
performance, incompetence, or
willful neglect of duty and no
additional documentation shall be
required to substantiate such
charges” (Louisiana Revised Statute
Annotated § 17:443(D) (2012)
(House Bill 974 (2012). Retrieved
June 1, 2012, from Lousiana State
Legislature Web Site:
http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/
streamdocument.asp?did=793654).

(ii) Ineffective
(Louisiana Revised
Statute Annotated §
17:3902(C)(1) (2010)).
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Table A12.
Maine’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A
Tenured Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

School districts must use
four levels of effectiveness
ratings: “At least 2 of the
levels must represent
effectiveness, and at least
“The proportionate weight of the
one level must represent
standards and the measures is a local
ineffectiveness” (20-A
decision, but measurements of student
Maine Revised Statute
learning and growth must be a
Annotated § 13704(3)(C)
significant factor in the determination
Two consecutive years of
(2015) (amended by Maine
of the rating of an educator” (20-A
summative effectiveness ratings of
Legislature (2012). H.P.
Maine Revised Statute Annotated §
ineffective “constitutes just cause
1376 - L.D. 1858: An Act
13704(3)(A) (2015) (amended by Maine for nonrenewal of a teacher’s
To Ensure Effective
contract unless the ratings are the
Legislature (2012). H.P. 1376 - L.D.
Teaching and School
result of bad faith” (20-A Maine
1858: An Act To Ensure Effective
Leadership. Retrieved May
Revised Statute Annotated § 13703
Teaching and School Leadership.
21, 2012, from
Maine
(2015) (amended by Maine
Retrieved May 21, 2012, from
www.mainelegislature.org/le
www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/ge Legislature (2012). H.P. 1376 - L.D.
gis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper
tPDF.asp?paper=HP1376&item=4&sn 1858: An Act To Ensure Effective
=HP1376&item=4&snum=
um=125); 20-A Maine Revised Statute
Teaching and School Leadership.
125); (20-A Maine Revised
Annotated § 13705 (2015) (amended by Retrieved May 21, 2012, from
Statute Annotated § 13702
www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills
Maine Legislature (2012). H.P. 1376 (2015) (amended by Maine
L.D. 1858: An Act To Ensure Effective /getPDF.asp?paper=HP1376&item
Legislature (2012). H.P.
=4&snum=125)).[1]
Teaching and School Leadership.
1376 - L.D. 1858: An Act
Retrieved May 21, 2012, from
To Ensure Effective
www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/ge
Teaching and School
tPDF.asp?paper=HP1376&item=4&sn
Leadership. Retrieved May
um=125)).
21, 2012, from
www.mainelegislature.org/le
gis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper
=HP1376&item=4&snum=
125)).
[1] Just cause for dismissal or nonrenewal of teachers who have completed the probationary period is subject to
collective bargaining negotiations (20-A Maine Revised Statute Annotated § 13201 (2012) (amended by Maine
Legislature (2012). H.P. 1376 - L.D. 1858: An Act To Ensure Effective Teaching and School Leadership. Retrieved May
21, 2012, from www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=HP1376&item=4&snum=125)).
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Table A13.
Maryland’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Maryland

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

Teacher performance evaluations must
“include data on student growth as a
significant component of the evaluation
and as one of multiple measures” (Maryland
Code, Education, § 6-202(c)(4)(i) (2010)).
However, “[n]o single criterion shall account
for more than 35% of the total performance
evaluation criteria” (Maryland Code,
Education, § 6-202(c)(5)(ii) (2010)).

None

The minimum
categories are:

(i) Satisfactory;
(ii) Unsatisfactory
(Code of Maryland
Regulations
(COMAR)
13A.07.04.02(A)(3)
(2010)).
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Table A14.
Massachusetts’ Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

The law provides that “[m]ultiple
measures of student learning, growth,
and achievement” must be used (Code
of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR)
603 CMR 35.07(1)(a) (2011)).

None[1]

The four ratings
categories used are:
(i) Exemplary;[2]

(ii) Proficient;[3]
(iii) Needs
Improvement;[4]
(iv) Unsatisfactory[5]
(Code of
Massachusetts
Regulations (CMR)
603 CMR 35.02
(2011); (Code of
Massachusetts
Regulations (CMR)
603 CMR 35.08(1)
(2011)).[6]
[1] The law does provide that teacher evaluations “may be used in decisions to dismiss, demote or remove a teacher”
(Massachusetts General Laws Annotated 71 § 38 (1993)).
[2] This refers to where the “educator’s performance consistently and significantly exceeds the requirements of a
standard or overall” (Code of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR) 603 CMR 35.02 (2011)).
[3] This refers to where the “educator’s performance fully and consistently meets the requirements of a standard or
overall” (Code of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR) 603 CMR 35.02 (2011)).
[4] This refers to where the “educator’s performance on a standard or overall is below the requirements of a standard or
overall, but is not considered to be unsatisfactory at this time.
Improvement is necessary and expected” (Code of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR) 603 CMR 35.02 (2011)).
[5] This refers to where the “educator’s performance on a standard or overall has not significantly improved following a
rating of needs improvement, or the educator’s performance is consistently below the requirements of a standard or
overall and is considered inadequate, or both” (Code of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR) 603 CMR 35.02 (2011)).
[6] Furthermore, “the evaluator will assign the rating on growth in student performance consistent with Department
guidelines: (a) A rating of high indicates significantly higher than one year's growth relative to academic peers in the
grade or subject. (b) A rating of moderate indicates one year's growth relative to academic peers in the grade or subject.
(c) A rating of low indicates significantly lower than one year's student learning growth relative to academic peers in the
grade or subject” (Code of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR) 603 CMR 35.09(3) (2011)).
Massachusetts
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Table A15.
Michigan’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

School district evaluations of teachers must
comply with the following:

A district must dismiss a teacher who
receives a rating of “ineffective on 3
consecutive annual year-end
evaluations”[1] (Michigan Compiled
Laws § 380.1249(2)(h) (2011)).[2]

(i) Highly effective;

“For the annual year-end evaluation for the
2013-2014 school year, at least 25% of the
annual year-end evaluation shall be based on
student growth and assessment data”
(Michigan Compiled Laws § 380.1249(2)(a)(i)
(2011)).
Michigan

“For the annual year-end evaluation for the
2014-2015 school year, at least 40% of the
annual year-end evaluation shall be based on
student growth and assessment data”
(Michigan Compiled Laws § 380.1249(2)(a)(i)
(2011)).

(ii) Effective;
(iii) Minimally
effective; or
(iv) Ineffective
(Michigan Compiled
Laws §
380.1249(1)(c)(2011));
(Michigan Compiled
Laws § 380.1249(2)(e)
(2011)).

“Beginning with the annual year-end
evaluation for the 2015-2016 school year, at
least 50% of the annual year-end evaluation
shall be based on student growth and
assessment data” (Michigan Compiled Laws §
380.1249(2)(a)(i) (2011)).
[1] Additionally, the law provides that “[t]his subdivision does not affect the ability of a school district, intermediate
school district, or public school academy to dismiss an ineffective teacher from his or her employment regardless of
whether the teacher is rated as ineffective on 3 consecutive annual year-end evaluations” (Michigan Compiled Laws §
380.1249(2)(h) (2011)).
[2] Ironically, even though the choice of three as the number of evaluations is arguably arbitrary, the state law provides
that “discharge or demotion of a teacher on continuing tenure may be made only for a reason that is not arbitrary or
capricious” (Michigan Compiled Laws § 38.101(1) (2011)). A quick note on Missouri: the state seems poised to
introduce student achievement data into its evaluation process in the near future
((JoLynne, 2012). New Teacher Evaluation System on Agenda for Missouri State Board of Education. Retrieved May 21,
2012, from KC Education Enterprise Web Site:
http://kceducationenterprise.org/2012/05/17/new-teacher-evaluation-system-on-agenda-for-missouri-state-board-ofeducation). Mississippi appears to also be on the same path (Hess, J. (2012, January, 18). Mississippi Department of
Education Testing Teacher Evaluation System. Retrieved May 21, 2012, from MPB News Web Site:
http://mpbonline.org/News/article/mississippi_department_of_education_testing_teacher_evaluation_system).
California, on the other hand, seems reluctant to adopt evaluations based on student test scores (Los Angeles Times,
(2012, May, 10). State Education Board Wants to Avoid New Teacher Evaluation Plan. retrieved May 21, 2012, from
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/05/california-education-board-teacher-evaluation.html). Nebraska
appears to want to take the approach of merely creating a model evaluation which local schools district can opt to adopt
or not adopt (Reutter, H. (2012, March, 24). Education Officials Question Use of Yearly Progress Checks. Retrieved
May 21, 2012, from
http://www.theindependent.com/news/local/education-officials-question-use-of-yearly-progresschecks/article_003815de-7620-11e1-bb93-0019bb2963f4.html).
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North Carolina does not yet use quantified student achievement. However, for low-performing schools, the state “shall
dismiss a teacher, principal, assistant principal, director, supervisor, or other licensed personnel when the Secretary
receives two consecutive evaluations that include written findings and recommendations regarding that person’s
inadequate performance” (North Carolina General Statute § 115C-325(p)(1) (2011); North Carolina General Statute §
115C-325(q)(2) (2011); North Carolina State Board of Education, (2009). North Carolina Teacher Evaluation Process.
Retrieved May 21, 2012, from http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/profdev/training/teacher/teacher-eval.pdf). No
timeline is specified for teachers in schools that are not low-performing. The law does, however, allow for the dismissal
of career teachers on the grounds of inadequate performance. “Inadequate performance for a teacher shall mean (i) the
failure to perform at a proficient level on any standard of the evaluation instrument or (ii) otherwise performing in a
manner that is below standard. … For a career teacher, a performance rating below proficient shall constitute inadequate
performance unless the principal noted on the instrument that the teacher is making adequate progress toward
proficiency given the circumstances” (North Carolina General Statute § 115C-325(e)(3) (2011)). See also North Carolina
State Board of Education, (2009). North Carolina Teacher Evaluation Process. retrieved May 21, 2012, from
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/profdev/training/teacher/teacher-eval.pdf).
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Table A16.
Minnesota’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

The local school board and the teacher’s union
are to negotiate an evaluation process that “must
use an agreed upon teacher value-added
assessment model for the grade levels and subject
areas for which value-added data are available and
establish state or local measures of student growth
for the grade levels and subject areas for which
value-added data are not available as a basis for 35
percent of teacher evaluation results” (Minnesota
Statute § 122A.40(8)(a),(b)(8) (2013); Minnesota
Statute § 122A.41(5)(a),(b)(8) (2013)).

A school district can choose to
terminate a teacher’s continuing
contract at the end of the school
year for inefficiency based on the
results of the teacher’s evaluations
(Minnesota Statute § 122A.40(9)(a)
(2014); Minnesota Statute §
122A.41(6)(a)(3) (2014)).

None

Minnesota

Furthermore, the law provides that the
school district “must discipline” a
teacher who fails to make adequate
progress in teacher improvement
based on the evaluation results. Such
discipline “may include a last chance
warning, termination, discharge,
nonrenewal, transfer to a different
position, a leave of absence, or other
discipline a school administrator
determines is appropriate” (Minnesota
Statute § 122A.41(5)(b)(12) (2013)).

Table A17.
Nevada’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Nevada

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A
Tenured Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

Student achievement data maintained
in the state’s automated system of
accountability information must
account for 50% of the teacher
evaluations adopted by each school
district (Nevada Revised Statute §
391.3125(2) (2013); Nevada Revised
Statute § 391.465(2)(c) (2011); Nevada
Revised Statute § 386.650(1)(c)-(e)
(2013)).

“A postprobationary employee who
receives an unsatisfactory evaluation
… or any other equivalent
evaluation designating his or her
overall performance as below
average, for 2 consecutive school
years shall be deemed to be a
probationary employee … and must
serve an additional probationary
period” (Nevada Revised Statute §
391.3129 (2013)).

(i) Highly effective;

(ii) Effective;
(iii) Minimally effective; or
(iv) Ineffective (Nevada
Revised Statute §
391.465(2)(a) (2011);
Nevada Revised Statute §
391.3125(2) (2013)).
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Table A18.
New Jersey’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

Fifty percent of the teacher evaluations
must be based on student achievement
(New Jersey Administrative Code
Executive Order No. 42(3)(a) (2010);
New Jersey Educator Effectiveness Task
Force (2011). Interim Report 15.
Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
http://www.state.nj.us/education/educa
tors/effectiveness.pdf) ).[1]

None

(i) Ineffective;

(ii) Partially effective;
(iii) Effective; and
(iv) Highly Effective
(State of New Jersey
Department of
Education (2011).
Department of
Education Announces
11 Districts to
Participate in a Teacher
Evaluation Pilot
Program. Retrieved
June 1, 2012, from
http://www.state.nj.us
/education/news/2011
/0901ee4nj.htm); New
Jersey Educator
Effectiveness Task
Force (2011). Interim
Report 14. Retrieved
June 1, 2012, from
http://www.state.nj.us
/education/educators/
effectiveness.pdf).[2]

New Jersey
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Table A19.
New York’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

The state’s teacher performance evaluation
system must be comprised of: (i) a state
assessments and other comparable
measures subcomponent which shall
comprise twenty or twenty-five percent of
the evaluation; (ii) a locally selected
measures of student achievement
subcomponent which shall comprise
twenty or fifteen percent of the evaluation;
and (iii) an other measures of teacher or
principal effectiveness subcomponent
which shall comprise the remaining sixty
percent of the evaluation, which in sum
shall constitute the composite teacher or
principal effectiveness score
(New York Education Law § 3012c(1)(a)(1) (2012); New York Education
Law § 3012-c(1)(h) (2012)).

A pattern of ineffective teaching or
performance shall be defined to mean two
consecutive annual ineffective ratings
received by a classroom teacher pursuant
to annual professional performance
reviews (New York Education Law §
3012-c(6) (2012); New York Education
Law § 3020(1) (2010)).

The overall
composite
scoring ranges
for performance
evaluations shall
be as follows:

(i) Highly
Effective if the
teacher gets a
composite
effectiveness
score of 91-100;

New York
For subjects and grades without an
approved value-added model, “forty
percent of the composite score of
effectiveness shall be based on student
achievement measures as follows: (i)
twenty percent of the evaluation shall be
based upon student growth data on state
assessments as prescribed by the
commissioner or a comparable measure of
student growth if such growth data is not
available; and (ii) twenty percent shall be
based on other locally selected measures
of student achievement that are
determined to be rigorous and comparable
across classrooms in accordance with the
regulations of the commissioner and as are
developed locally in a manner consistent
with procedures negotiated pursuant to
the requirements of article fourteen of the
civil service law (New York Education
Law § 3012-c(1)(b)(1) (2012); (New York
Education Law § 3012-c(1)(e)(1) (2012)).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2388436

(ii) Effective if
the teacher gets a
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score of 75-90;
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Table A19. (Cont.’d)
New York’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories
(iii) Developing if
the teacher gets a
composite
effectiveness
score of 65-74;
and
(iv) Ineffective if
the gets a
composite
effectiveness
score of 0-64
(New York
Education Law §
3012-c(1)(a)(2)
(2012)).
For subjects and
grades without
an approved
value-added
model, “the
scoring ranges
for the student
growth on state
assessments or
other comparable
measures
subcomponent”
of the
performance
evaluations shall
be as follows:

New York

(i) A Highly
Effective rating
in this
subcomponent if
the teacher’s
results are wellabove the state
average for
similar students
and he/she
achieves a
subcomponent
score of 18-20;
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Table A19. (Cont.’d)
New York’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

New York

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2388436

Teacher
Performance
Categories
(ii) An Effective
rating in this
subcomponent if
the teacher’s
results meet the
state average for
similar students
and he/she
achieves a
subcomponent
score of 9-17; or
(iii) A
Developing
rating in this
subcomponent if
the teacher’s
results are below
the state average
for similar
students and
he/she achieves a
subcomponent
score of 3-8; or
(iv) An
Ineffective rating
in this
subcomponent, if
the teacher’s
results are wellbelow the state
average for
similar students
and he/she
achieves a
subcomponent
score of 0-2
(New York
Education Law §
3012-c(1)(a)(3)
(2012)).
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Table A19. (Cont.’d)
New York’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

New York
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Teacher
Performance
Categories
For subjects and
grades with an
approved valueadded model, “the
scoring ranges for
the student growth
on state
assessments or
other comparable
measures
subcomponent” of
the performance
evaluations shall
be as be as
follows:
(i) a highly
effective rating in
this
subcomponent if
the teacher’s
results are wellabove the state
average for similar
students and
he/she achieves a
subcomponent
score of 22-25;
(ii) an effective
rating in this
subcomponent if
the teacher’s
results meet the
state average for
similar students
and he/she
achieves a
subcomponent
score of 10-21; or
(iii) a developing
rating in this
subcomponent if
the teacher’s
results are below
the state average
for similar
students and
he/she achieves a
subcomponent
score of 3-9; or
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Table A19. (Cont.’d)
New York’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

New York
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Teacher
Performance
Categories
(iv) an ineffective
rating in this
subcomponent, if
the teacher’s
results are wellbelow the state
average for
similar students
and he/she
achieves a
subcomponent
score of 0-2
(New York
Education Law §
3012-c(1)(a)(4)
(2012)).
For subjects and
grades without an
approved valueadded model,
“the scoring
ranges for the
locally selected
measures of
student
achievement
subcomponent”
of the
performance
evaluations shall
be as follows:
(i) a highly
effective rating in
this
subcomponent if
the results are
well-above
district-adopted
expectations for
student growth
or achievement
and the teacher
gets a
subcomponent
score of 18-20; or
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Table A19. (Cont.’d)
New York’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

New York
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Teacher
Performance
Categories
(ii) an effective
rating in this
subcomponent if
the results meet
district-adopted
expectations for
growth or
achievement and
the teacher gets a
subcomponent
score of 9-17; or
(iii) a developing
rating in this
subcomponent if
the results are
below districtadopted
expectations for
growth or
achievement and
the teacher gets a
subcomponent
score of 3-8; or
(iv) an ineffective
rating in this
subcomponent if
the results are
well-below
district-adopted
expectations for
growth or
achievement and
the teacher gets a
subcomponent
score of 0-2
(New York
Education Law §
3012-c(1)(a)(5)
(2012)).
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Table A19. (Cont.’d)
New York’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

New York
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Teacher
Performance
Categories
For subjects and
grades with an
approved valueadded model,
“the scoring
ranges for the
locally selected
measures of
student
achievement
subcomponent”
of the
performance
evaluations shall
be as follows:
(i) A Highly
effective rating in
this
subcomponent if
the results are
well-above
district-adopted
expectations for
student growth
or achievement
and the teacher
gets a
subcomponent
score of 14-15; or
(ii) An Effective
rating in this
subcomponent if
the results meet
district-adopted
expectations for
growth or
achievement and
the teacher gets a
subcomponent
score of 8-13; or
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Table A19. (Cont.’d)
New York’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

New York
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Teacher
Performance
Categories
(iii) A
Developing
rating in this
subcomponent if
the results are
below districtadopted
expectations for
growth or
achievement and
the teacher gets a
subcomponent
score of 3-7; or
(iv) An
Ineffective rating
in this
subcomponent if
the results are
well-below
district-adopted
expectations for
growth or
achievement and
the teacher gets a
subcomponent
score of 0-2
(New York
Education Law §
3012-c(1)(a)(6)
(2012)).
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Table A20.
Ohio’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Ohio

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A
Tenured Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

Student academic growth must constitute
fifty percent of the teacher evaluation
(Ohio Revised Code Annotated §
3319.112(A)(1) (2011)).

None[1]

(i) Accomplished;
(ii) Proficient;
(iii) Developing; and

(iv) Ineffective (Ohio
Revised Code
Annotated §
3319.112(B)(1) (2011)).
[1] The law does provide, however, that each school district must “include in its evaluation policy procedures for using
the evaluation results for retention and promotion decisions and for removal of poorly performing teachers” (Ohio
Revised Code Annotated § 3319.111(E) (2011)).
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Table A21.
Oklahoma’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher
Performance
Categories
The Oklahoma
Teacher and Leader
Effectiveness
Evaluation System
(TLE) uses the
following five-tier
rating system:

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Fifty percent (50%) of the teacher’s
evaluations must be based on
quantitative components divided as
follows:

Oklahoma authorizes dismissal of career
teachers (tenured teachers) for instructional
ineffectiveness (Oklahoma Statutes
Annotated § 6-101.22 (A)(5) (2011)) as
follows:

(1) thirty-five percentage points based
on student academic growth using
multiple years of standardized test data,
as available; and

(i) A career teacher who has been rated as
‘Ineffective’ as measured pursuant to the
Oklahoma Teacher and Leader
Effectiveness Evaluation System (TLE) …
for two (2) consecutive school years shall
be dismissed or not reemployed on the
grounds of instructional ineffectiveness by
the school district (Oklahoma Statutes
Annotated § 6-101.22 (C)(1) (2011)).

(i) Superior;

(2) fifteen percentage points based on
other academic measurements
(Oklahoma Statutes Annotated § 6101.16(B)(4) (2011)).

(ii) A career teacher who has been rated as
‘Needs Improvement’ or lower pursuant to
the TLE for three (3) consecutive school
years shall be dismissed or not reemployed
on the grounds of instructional
ineffectiveness by the school district
(Oklahoma Statutes Annotated § 6-101.22
(C)(2) (2011)).

(ii) Highly effective;

(iii) A career teacher who has not averaged
a rating of at least ‘Effective’ as measured
pursuant to the TLE over a five-year
period shall be dismissed or not
reemployed on the grounds of instructional
ineffectiveness by the school district
(Oklahoma Statutes Annotated § 6-101.22
(C)(3) (2011)).

(iii) Effective;

Oklahoma

(iv) Needs
Improvement; and
(v) Ineffective (70
Oklahoma Statutes
Annotated § 6101.16(B)(1) (2011).
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Table A22.
Oregon’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A
Tenured Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

Student learning must be a significant factor
in teacher evaluations developed by school
districts (Oregon Revised Statutes Annotated §
342.856 (2013); Oregon Administrative Rules
Compilation 581-022-1723 (2013); Oregon
State Board of Education (2012, May).
Educator Effectiveness: Oregon Framework
for Teacher and Administrator Evaluation and
Support Systems. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
www.ode.state.or.us/stateboard/pdfs/2012may-17-educator-effectiveness-framework-forlocal-teacher-and-admin-evaluationsystems.pdf).[1]

None[2]

The four performance
levels to be used are:

(i) Level 1 –
Unsatisfactory
(ii) Level 2 – Basic;

Oregon

(iii) Level 3 – Satisfactory;
and
(iv) Level 4 –
Distinguished (Oregon
State Board of Education
(2012, May). Educator
Effectiveness: Oregon
Framework for Teacher
and Administrator
Evaluation and Support
Systems. Retrieved June
1, 2012, from
www.ode.state.or.us/state
board/pdfs/2012-may17-educatoreffectiveness-frameworkfor-local-teacher-andadmin-evaluationsystems.pdf)
[1] Oregon is in the process of developing its policies (Oregon State Board of Education (2012, May). Educator
Effectiveness: Oregon Framework for Teacher and Administrator Evaluation and Support Systems. Retrieved June 1,
2012, from www.ode.state.or.us/stateboard/pdfs/2012-may-17-educator-effectiveness-framework-for-local-teacher-andadmin-evaluation-systems.pdf; Oregon Education Association (2011). Teacher Evaluation. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
http://www.oregoned.org/site/pp.asp?c=9dKKKYMDH&b=6573779; Oregon Department of Education (2012, May).
Oregon Framework for Teacher and Administrator Evaluation and Support Systems Draft. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=oregon%20framework%20for%20teacher%20and%20administrator%20ev
aluation%20and%20support%20systems&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CGIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww
.ode.state.or.us%2Fstateboard%2Fpdfs%2Fhandout---oregon-framework-for-educators--administratorevaluations.pdf&ei=IJ7DT6SfLILs6gHI-KHSCg&usg=AFQjCNEvLGt8qj_nBaRIg0OUnUOGvTrQhQ&cad=rja).
[2] While no timeline is specified, the state allows dismissal for inefficiency (Oregon Revised Statute
§342.865(1)(a)(1999)), inadequate performance (Oregon Revised Statute § 342.865(1)(g)(1999)) or “[f]ailure to comply
with such reasonable requirements as the board may prescribe to show normal improvement and evidence of
professional training and growth” (Oregon Revised Statute § 342.865(1)(h)(1999)).
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Table A23.
Pennsylvania’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

The state legislature and the department of
A teacher could be terminated for
education “seem to be gravitating toward
“unsatisfactory teaching performance
counting multiple measures of student
based on two (2) consecutive ratings of
achievement and growth as up to 50 percent
the employee’s teaching performance
of a teacher’s individual evaluation result, but
that are to include classroom
no final decision has been made” (PSEA
To be
observations, not less than four (4)
Pennsylvania
Education Services Division (2011).
determined
months apart, in which the employee's
Pennsylvania’s New Teacher Evaluation
teaching performance is rated as
System. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
unsatisfactory” (24 Pennsylvania Statutes
http://slea.psealocals.org/Portals/444/Advis
and Consolidated Statutes § 11-1122
ory%20new%20eval%20system%20FINAL%
(1996)).
20Aug%202011.pdf)[1]
[1] Pennsylvania is in the process of creating its evaluation policies (Pennsylvania Department of Education, (2011).
Teacher Evaluation Project FAQ. retrieved June 1, 2012, from
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/7234/teacher_evaluation/1036220; Aument,
Ryan (2010). Pennsylvania Department of Education to Begin Statewide Pilot Project to Continue Education Reform
Efforts. Retrieved June 1, 2012, fromhttp://repaument.com/NewsItem.aspx?NewsID=12432). A side note about
Texas: While the state does not have a statewide requirement of quantified student performance for evaluations, some
individual districts in Texas use student performance to evaluate teachers (Texas Education Agency (2011). Teacher
Evaluations Including Student Performance. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
ww.tea.state.tx.us/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=2147502760&libID=2147502754; Texas
Education Agency (2011). Systems Used to Evaluate Teacher Performance. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=2147502759&libID=2147502753).
Similar information is available for Vermont (Vermont Department of Education (2012, March). Teacher Evaluation
Survey. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from http://education.vermont.gov/documents/EDUARRA_SFSF_Teacher_%20State_Level_Evaluation_Survey.pdf).
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Table A24.
Rhode Island’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Rhode Island

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?
“An educator’s overall evaluation of
effectiveness is primarily determined by
evidence of impact on student growth and
academic achievement” (Rhode Island
Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education (2009). Educator Evaluation System
Standards 3. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
http://www.ride.ri.gov/EducatorQuality/Educ
atorEvaluation/Docs/EdEvalStandards.pdf;
Rhode Island Board of Regents (2011). The
Rhode Island Model: Guide to Evaluating
Building Administrators and Teachers 61-66.
Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
http://www.ride.ri.gov/EducatorQuality/Educ
atorEvaluation/Docs/RIModelGuide.pdf;
Rhode Island Board of Regents (2011). The
Rhode Island Growth Model. Retrieved June 4,
2012, from
http://www.ride.ri.gov/assessment/DOCS/RI
GM/RIGM_Pamphlet_FINALSpring_2011.pdf).

Timelines For Dismissing A
Tenured Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

None[1]

The four
performance
evaluation categories
required are:

(i) Highly Effective;
(ii) Effective,;
(iii) Developing; and
(iv) Ineffective
(Rhode Island Board
of Regents (2011).
The Rhode Island
Model: Guide to
Evaluating Building
Administrators and
Teachers 61.
Retrieved June 1,
2012, from
http://www.ride.ri.g
ov/EducatorQuality
/EducatorEvaluatio
n/Docs/RIModelG
uide.pdf).
[1] “Teachers who are rated as Developing or Ineffective at the end of the year will be placed on an Improvement Plan
and will work with an improvement team to assist them with their development over the course of the following year. …
The teacher’s district will identify personnel actions that may occur if he or she does not adequately improve his or her
performance” (Rhode Island Board of Regents (2011). The Rhode Island Model: Guide to Evaluating Building
Administrators and Teachers 28. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
http://www.ride.ri.gov/EducatorQuality/EducatorEvaluation/Docs/RIModelGuide.pdf).
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Table A25.
South Dakota’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based
On Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

Fifty percent of the teacher evaluation
must be “based on quantitative measures
of student growth, based on a single year
or multiple years of data” (South Dakota
Codified Laws § 13-42-34(2) (a) (2014)
(amended by South Dakota Legislature
(2011). House Bill 1234. Retrieved June 1,
2012, from
http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2012/Bill
s/HB1234ENR.pdf)).

A district can choose not to renew a
teacher’s contract if the teacher is rated
unsatisfactory on two consecutive
evaluations (South Dakota Codified Laws §
13-43-6.3 (2012) (amended by South Dakota
Legislature (2011). House Bill 1234.
Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2012/Bills/
HB1234ENR.pdf)).

The
performance
evaluations are
based on the
following fourtier rating
system:
(i)
Distinguished;
(ii) Proficient;

South Dakota

(iii) Basic; and
(iv)
Unsatisfactory
(South Dakota
Codified Laws §
13-42-34(5)
(2014)
(amended by
South Dakota
Legislature
(2011). House
Bill 1234.
Retrieved June
1, 2012, from
http://legis.stat
e.sd.us/sessions
/2012/Bills/HB
1234ENR.pdf)).
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Table A26.
Tennessee’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Tennessee

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

Fifty percent (50%) of the teacher
performance evaluation in the Tennessee
Educator Acceleration Model (TEAM) must
be made up of student achievement data
divided as follows:

“Any teacher who, after acquiring tenure
status, receives two (2) consecutive years
of evaluations demonstrating an overall
performance effectiveness level of ‘below
expectations’ or ‘significantly below
expectations’ … shall be returned to
probationary status by the director of
schools until the teacher has received two
(2) consecutive years of evaluations
demonstrating an overall performance
effectiveness level of ‘above expectations’
or ‘significantly above expectations’”
(Tennessee Code Annotated § 49-5-504(e)
(2011)).[1]

Tennessee
Educator
Acceleration
Model (TEAM)
uses the following
five categories:

(i) 35% must be “student achievement data
based on student growth data as represented
by the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment
System (TVAAS) … or some other
comparable measure of student growth, if
no such TVAAS data is available”
(Tennessee Code Annotated § 49-1302(d)(2)(A)(i) (2011));

The state law provides, however, that
“[n]o teacher who acquired tenure status
prior to July 1, 2011, shall be returned to
probationary status” (Tennessee Code
Annotated § 49-5-501(11) (2011)). In fact,
the law specifically states that the
provision about two consecutive years of
evaluations mentioned above does not
apply to teachers who got tenure before
July 1, 2011 (Tennessee Code Annotated §
49-5-504(f) (2011)).

(i) Significantly
Above
Expectations
based on a score
between 425500;[2]

(ii) the remaining 15% must use some other
student achievement measure chosen from a
list of created by the teacher evaluation
advisory committee and approved by the
state board of education (Tennessee Code
Annotated § 49-1-302(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2011)).

(ii) Above
Expectations
based on a score
between 350424.99;[3]
(iii) At
Expectations
based on a score
between 275349.99;[4]
(iv) Below
Expectations
based on a score
between 200274.99;[5] and
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Table A26. (Cont.’d)
Tennessee’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
Teacher
Performance
Categories
(v) Significantly
Below
Expectations
based on a score
below 200[6]
(Tennessee
Department of
Education (2011).
Tennessee First to
Tennessee
the Top Score
Calculations 3.
Retrieved June 1,
2012, from
http://teamtn.org/assets/educ
atorresources/Calculat
ing_the_Effective
ness_Rating.pdf).
[1] “When a teacher who has returned to probationary status has received two (2) consecutive years of evaluations
demonstrating an overall performance effectiveness level of ‘above expectations’ or ‘significantly above expectations,’
the teacher is again eligible for tenure and shall be either recommended by the director of schools for tenure or
nonrenewed; provided, however, that the teacher cannot be continued in employment if tenure is not granted by the
board of education” (Tennessee Code Annotated § 49-5-504(e) (2011)).
[2] “A teacher at this level exemplifies the instructional skills, knowledge, and responsibilities described in the rubric, and
implements them without fail. He/she is adept at using data to set and reach ambitious teaching and learning goals.
He/she makes a significant impact on student achievement and should be considered a model of exemplary teaching”
(Tennessee Department of Education (2011).
Tennessee First to the Top Score Calculations 3. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from http://team-tn.org/assets/educatorresources/Calculating_the_Effectiveness_Rating.pdf).
[3] “A teacher at this level comprehends the instructional skills, knowledge, and responsibilities described in the rubric
and implements them consistently. He/she is skilled at using data to set and reach appropriate teaching and learning
goals and makes a strong impact on student achievement” (Tennessee Department of Education (2011). Tennessee First
to the Top Score Calculations 3.
Retrieved June 1, 2012, from http://team-tn.org/assets/educator-resources/Calculating_the_Effectiveness_Rating.pdf).
[4] “A teacher at this level understands and implements most of the instructional skills, knowledge, and responsibilities
described in the rubric. He/she uses data to set and reach teaching and learning goals and makes the expected impact on
student achievement” (Tennessee Department of Education (2011). Tennessee First to the Top Score Calculations 3.
Retrieved June 1, 2012, from http://team-tn.org/assets/educator-resources/Calculating_the_Effectiveness_Rating.pdf).
[5] “A teacher at this level demonstrates some knowledge of the instructional skills, knowledge, and responsibilities
described in the rubric, but implements them inconsistently. He/she may struggle to use data to set and reach
appropriate teaching and learning goals. His/her impact on student achievement is less than expected” (Tennessee
Department of Education (2011). Tennessee First to the Top Score Calculations 3. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from
http://team-tn.org/assets/educator-resources/Calculating_the_Effectiveness_Rating.pdf).
[6] “A teacher at this level has limited knowledge of the instructional skills, knowledge, and responsibilities described in
the rubric, and struggles to implement them. He/she makes little attempt to use data to set and reach appropriate
teaching and learning goals, and has little to no impact on student achievement” (Tennessee Department of Education
(2011). Tennessee First to the Top Score Calculations 3. Retrieved June 1, 2012, from http://teamtn.org/assets/educator-resources/Calculating_the_Effectiveness_Rating.pdf).
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective
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Table A27.
Utah’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
Teacher
Performance
Categories
To be determined
(Utah
Administrative
“If the district intends to terminate a
Currently, the law merely requires that
Rule 277-531career employee's contract during its term
evaluation systems adopted by school
1(2011); Utah
for reasons of unsatisfactory performance
districts must include “evidence of student
State Office of
or discontinue a career employee’s
growth” (Utah Administrative Rule 277-531Education (2012).
contract beyond the current school year
3(B)(3)(b) (2011); Utah Administrative Rule
Teaching and
for reasons of unsatisfactory performance,
277-531-3(C)(1)(b) (2011); Utah
Utah
Learning
the unsatisfactory performance must be
Administrative Rule 277-531-3(F)(4)(b)
Licensing.
documented in at least two evaluations
(2015)). The state board of education will
Retrieved June 3,
conducted at any time within the
determine the weight of each component of
2012, from
preceding three years in accordance with
the evaluation (Utah Administrative Rule
http://www.schoo
district policies or practices” (Utah Code
277-531-3(F)(5) (2011)).
ls.utah.gov/cert/E
Annotated § 53A-8-104(2) (2011)).[1]
ducatorEffectivenessProject.aspx)
[1] Each district’s evaluation policy must specify the employment consequences of teachers’ failure to meet performance
requirements (Utah Administrative Rule 277-531-3(F)(7) (2011)). Utah is still developing its evaluation policy (Utah State
Office of Education (2012). Teaching and Learning Licensing. Retrieved June 3, 2012, from
http://www.schools.utah.gov/cert/Educator-Effectiveness-Project.aspx).
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective
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Table A28.
Virgina’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On Quantified Student
Achievement?

Timelines For
Dismissing A
Tenured Teacher
Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

The Guidelines for Uniform Performance Standards and
Evaluation Criteria model set forth by the state board of
education “recommends that 40 percent of teachers’
evaluations be based on student academic progress, as
determined by multiple measures of learning and achievement,
including, when available and applicable, student-growth data”
(Virginia Department of Education (2012). Teaching in
Virginia: Performance and Evaluation. Retrieved June 3, 2012,
from
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/teaching/performance_evaluatio
n/; Virginia Department of Education (2012). The Guidelines
for Uniform Performance Standards and Evaluation Criteria
for Teachers 5, 67-68. Retrieved June 3, 2012, from
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/teaching/performance_evaluatio
n/guidelines_ups_eval_criteria_teachers.pdf).

None[1]

(i) Exemplary;

Virginia

(ii) Proficient;
(iii) Developing/Needs
Improvement;

(iv) Unacceptable
(Virginia Department of
Education (2012). The
Guidelines for Uniform
Performance Standards
and Evaluation Criteria
for Teachers 58.
Retrieved June 3, 2012,
from
http://www.doe.virginia
.gov/teaching/performa
nce_evaluation/guidelin
es_ups_eval_criteria_tea
chers.pdf).
[1] However, incompetence, one of the grounds for dismissal of continuing contract teachers “may be construed to
include, but shall not be limited to, consistent failure to meet the endorsement requirements for the position or
performance that is documented through evaluation to be consistently less than satisfactory” (Virginia Code Annotated §
22.1-307(B) (2008)). While Virginia does not explicitly identify a timeline specific to teachers with continuing contracts, it
specifies that for teachers in the state who are rated ‘Unacceptable’, the school district could opt to recommend the
teacher for dismissal. If the teacher is not dismissed, he/she will participate in a Performance Improvement Plan. If the
teacher gets a second ‘Unacceptable’ rating, the district must recommend the teacher for dismissal (Virginia Department
of Education (2012). The Guidelines for Uniform Performance Standards and Evaluation Criteria for Teachers 77.
Retrieved June 3, 2012, from
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/teaching/performance_evaluation/guidelines_ups_eval_criteria_teachers.pdf). For
teachers with continuing contracts who get a rating of ‘Unacceptable’, the guidelines provide that “a Performance
Improvement Plan will be developed and implemented. Following implementation of the Performance Improvement
Plan, additional performance data, including observations as applicable, will be collected” (Virginia Department of
Education (2012). The Guidelines for Uniform Performance Standards and Evaluation Criteria for Teachers 77.
Retrieved June 3, 2012, from
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/teaching/performance_evaluation/guidelines_ups_eval_criteria_teachers.pdf).
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Table A29.
Washington’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A
Tenured Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

Not specified yet[1]

“When a continuing contract
employee with five or more years of
experience receives a comprehensive
summative evaluation performance
rating below level 2 for two
consecutive years, the school
district shall, within ten days of the
completion of the second
summative comprehensive
evaluation or May 15th, whichever
occurs first, implement the
employee notification of discharge”
(Revised Code of Washington
Annotated 28A.405.100(4)(c) (2012)
amended by Senate Bill 5895;
Revised Code of Washington
Annotated 28A.405.300 (2010)).

Teacher summative
performance evaluations
ratings use the following
four categories:

(i) Level 1 unsatisfactory;

Washington

(ii) Level 2 - basic;
(iii) Level 3 - proficient;
and
(iv) Level 4 –
distinguished (Revised
Code of Washington
Annotated
28A.405.100(2)(a) (2012)
amended by S.B. 5895;
Washington State
Legislature (2012).
Office of
Superintendent of
Public Instruction,
Teacher/Principal
Evaluation Pilot.
Retrieved June 3, 2012,
from
http://www.k12.wa.us/
EdLeg/TPEP/default.a
spx).
[1] Washington state is in the process of creating its evaluation policy (Dorn, Randy (2012). Teacher and Principal
Evaluation Pilot: Report to the Legislature. Retrieved June 3, 2012, from State Superintendent of Public Instruction Web
Site: http://tpep.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/tpep_leg_report-july_2011_full.pdf; Washington State Legislature
(2012). Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction, Teacher/Principal Evaluation Pilot. Retrieved June 3, 2012, from
http://www.k12.wa.us/EdLeg/TPEP/default.aspx; Washington's Teacher/Principal Evaluation Pilot (2012). Retrieved
June 3, 2012, from State Superintendent of Public Instruction Web Site: http://tpep-wa.org/).
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Table A30.
West Virginia’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

West
Virginia

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher Performance
Categories

“Fifteen percent of the evaluation shall be
based on evidence of the learning of the
students assigned to the educator … and
five percent of the evaluation shall be based
on student learning growth measured by the
school-wide score on the state summative
assessment” (West Virginia Code §18A-3C2(c)(2) (2013)).

A teacher who receives a rating of
‘Unsatisfactory’ must be given a
performance improvement plan and
provided a reasonable time though not
more than 12 months to comply with
the plan.[1] If the teacher’s evaluation
following the period of improvement
plan rates the teacher as
‘Unsatisfactory’ the evaluator could
choose to recommend dismissal of the
teacher (West Virginia Code §18A-3C2(c)(2) (2013)).

(i) Satisfactory; and

(ii) Unsatisfactory
(West Virginia Code
§18A-3C-2(h) (2013)).
[1] West Virginia allows dismissal of teachers with continuing contracts based on unsatisfactory performance (West
Virginia Code § 18A-2-8(a) (2007)). Unsatisfactory performance is determined by the teacher’s evaluation (West Virginia
Code § 18A-2-8(b) (2007)). Moreover, a new law in West Virginia provides that the results of teacher evaluations will
constitute “documentation for a dismissal on the grounds of unsatisfactory performance” (West Virginia Code §18A-3C2(e)(7) (2013)).
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Table A31.
Wisconsin’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Wisconsin

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

“Fifty percent of the total evaluation score
assigned to a teacher or principal shall be
based upon measures of student
performance, including performance on
state assessments, district-wide assessments,
student learning objectives, school-wide
reading at the elementary and middle-school
levels, and graduation rates at the high
school level” (Wisconsin Statutes Annotated
115.415(2)(a) (2014);Wisconsin Department
of Public Instruction (2011). Wisconsin
Framework for Educator Effectiveness:
Preliminary Report and Recommendations
8)).

While no specific timeline is provided, the
Wisconsin Department of Public
Instruction indicates that “[a]n educator
will not be allowed to remain at the
developing level and continue to practice
indefinitely. If an educator is rated as
developing over a time period the
educator will undergo an intervention
phase to improve on the areas rated as
developing. If, at the end of the
intervention phase, the educator is still
developing, the district shall move to a
removal phase” (Wisconsin Department
of Public Instruction (2011). Wisconsin
Framework for Educator Effectiveness:
Preliminary Report and
Recommendations 8)).

(i) Developing;

(ii) Effective; and
(iii) Exemplary
(Wisconsin
Statutes
Annotated
115.415(2)(c)
(2014; Wisconsin
Department of
Public Instruction
(2011). Wisconsin
Framework for
Educator
Effectiveness:
Preliminary Report
and
Recommendations
8)).
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Table A31.
Wyoming’s Approaches to the New Teacher Evaluation Movement
State

Wyoming

Teacher Evaluation Significantly Based On
Quantified Student Achievement?

Timelines For Dismissing A Tenured
Teacher Rated Ineffective

Teacher
Performance
Categories

Not specified[1] (Wyoming Rules and
Regulations Education General Chapter 29
§§ 4 - 6 (2010); Borchardt, Jackie (2011,
October 26). Report: Wyoming Educator
Evaluations Could Be Stronger. Retrieved
June 3, 2012, from Star-Tribune Web Site:
http://trib.com/news/state-andregional/report-wyoming-educatorevaluations-could-bestronger/article_12776e10-604e-532e-a0cda9dc54fdebed.html)

Starting with the 2013-2014 school year,
local school boards can choose to dismiss
a teacher for “inadequate performance as
determined through annual performance
evaluation tied to student academic
growth” (Wyoming Statutes Annotated §
21-7-110(a)(vii) (2012); Wyoming Statutes
Annotated § 21-3-110(a)(xvii)-(xix)
(2012)).[2]

(i) Highly
Effective;

(ii) Effective; and
(iii) Ineffective
(Wyoming Statutes
Annotated § 21-2304(b)(xv) (2012)).
[1] School districts seem to have some flexibility in the weighting allocated to student growth, though student growth
must be included (Wyoming Department of Education (2011). Certified Personnel Evaluation System-Chapter 29.
Retrieved June 3, 2012, from http://edu.wyoming.gov/Programs/certifiedpersonnelevaluationsytem.aspx)
[2] The state law does provide that “[s]ubject to satisfactory performance evaluation … a continuing contract teacher
shall be employed by each school district on a continuing basis from year to year without annual contract renewal at a
salary determined by the board of trustees of each district, said salary subject to increases from time to time as provided
for in the salary provisions adopted by the board” (Wyoming Statutes Annotated § 21-7-104(a) (2012)).
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